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Another Collateral Consequence: 
Kicking the Victim When She’s Down 
Lauren N. Hancock* 
Abstract  
Every state has a victim compensation fund that provides 
financial relief to victims of crime who have no other way to pay 
for medical expenses, funeral costs, crime scene cleanup, or other 
costs associated with the crime. States impose their own 
eligibility requirements to determine which victims can receive 
funding. Six states prohibit victims with certain criminal 
histories from obtaining compensation. This means that 
innocent victims of crime are left with nowhere to turn because 
of something that they already “paid” for. This leaves victims, 
who are likely already in a financially precarious situation due 
to their felon status, with no way to pay for their bills. To make 
matters worse, the bans disproportionately affect Black victims 
who are overrepresented in the criminal justice system. Despite 
this negative impact, the Supreme Court has made it clear that 
the victims will not find any redress in the law. In fact, Congress 
has enacted legislation that negatively affects individuals with a 
criminal history, despite the disproportionate negative impact on 
Black individuals.  
This Note suggests that Congress enact legislation 
prohibiting states receiving federal funding for their 
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without your never-ending love and support.  
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compensation funds from disqualifying victims based on their 
criminal history. Additionally, this Note encourages the six 
states with a criminal history ban to change their legislation and 
redefine “victim.”  
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I. Introduction 
In 2015, Antonio Mason’s life changed forever. At the time, 
Mason was studying to be a gym teacher at Cuyahoga Community 
College in Cleveland, Ohio.1 In addition to his studies, Mason was 
the cocaptain and starting point guard of his college basketball 
team.2 In a tragic turn of events, Mason was hit from behind by a 
drunk driver who was driving at one hundred miles per hour in a 
stolen sports car.3 Mason’s car flipped and he was ejected from the 
vehicle after striking two telephone poles.4 He fractured his 
vertebrae in two places, his neck was severely fractured, he had 
five screws placed in his back, two screws placed in his neck, broken 
ribs, a concussion, and was paralyzed from the chest down.5 After 
months spent between the hospital and a nursing home, Mason 
was finally released.6 In order to return home, however, Mason 
needed a wheelchair ramp installed at the house his mother was 
renting.7 Unable to afford such a costly installation in addition to 
his medical bills, Mason applied to Ohio’s victim compensation 
fund.8 Every state has a compensation fund that victims of 
crime can apply to for financial assistance with bills resulting 
 
 1. Alysia Santo, The Victims Who Don’t Count, MARSHALL PROJECT 
(Sept. 13, 2018, 7:00 AM), perma.cc/MZ7G-JCX6 [hereinafter Santo I]. 
 2. Tim Warsinskey, Paralyzed Tri-C Basketball Player Antonio Mason 
Dreams of Hoops, Hopes to Walk Again, CLEV. (Jan. 22, 2015), perma.cc/P9F6-
2RE5 (last updated Jan. 12, 2019). 
 3. Id.  
 4. Id.  
 5. P.J. Ziegler, ‘I Can See Myself Out There Playing Again’: Tri-C 
Basketball Player Paralyzed in Crash Hopes to Play Again, FOX 8 NEWS: CLEV. 
(Jan. 24, 2015, 9:00 AM), perma.cc/VN7E-YLBQ. 
 6. Tim Warsinskey, Paralyzed Tri-C Basketball Player Antonio Mason 
Finally Goes Home, CLEV. (Apr. 02, 2015), perma.cc/26ZX-H686 (last updated 
Jan. 11, 2019).  
 7. Id.   
 8. Santo I, supra note 1. 
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from the incident.9 Unfortunately, Ohio denies compensation to 
victims who were previously convicted of certain crimes.10 
Mason was rejected because ten years earlier, when he was just 
sixteen years old, he was found guilty of drug trafficking in 
juvenile court.11 Despite his complete innocence in the accident, 
Mason was left without any way to pay for the ramp that is 
necessary for his return home.12  
Similarly, Anthony Campbell was denied victim 
compensation after his father was murdered in Sarasota, 
Florida.13 Campbell, an Alabama State University football 
coach, emptied most of his savings to pay for his father’s funeral 
and burial.14 When he still came up short and was in need of 
financial help, police urged him to apply to Florida’s crime 
victim compensation fund.15 Regrettably, Florida denied 
Campbell because, thirty-two years earlier, his father had been 
convicted of a burglary.16 Like Ohio, Florida refuses to allocate 
victim compensation funds if the victim or the family member 
being compensated was convicted of certain crimes at any point 
in his or her life.17 It did not matter that by the end of his life 
people considered Campbell’s father a “prominent citizen”18 or 
 
 9. See Crime Victim Compensation: An Overview, NAT’L ASS’N CRIME 
VICTIM COMPENSATION BOARDS, https://perma.cc/U9UR-ZLNH (“[E]very state 
has a crime victim compensation program that can provide substantial 
financial assistance to crime victims and their families.”). 
 10. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.60 (LexisNexis 2019) (refusing funds 
if a “preponderance of the evidence” shows the victim engaged in “criminally 
injurious conduct” within ten years prior to the injury). 
 11. Santo I, supra note 1.  
 12. Id; see Warsinskey, supra note 6 (stating that news of Mason’s tragedy 
spread and numerous companies donated and installed a ramp, allowing 
Mason to return home).  
 13. Id; see Michael S. Davidson, Update: Brief Argument Preceded Fatal 
Shooting, HERALD-TRIB. (June 15, 2015), perma.cc/T52S-5PGV (last updated 
June 16, 2015) (reporting the murder).  
 14. Santo I, supra note 1. 
 15. Id.   
 16. Id.  
 17. See FLA. STAT. § 960.065 (LexisNexis 2020) (denying funds to victims 
who have been convicted of forcible felonies at any point in their lives). 
 18. Santo I, supra note 1. 
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that he was completely innocent in his own death.19 It did not 
even matter that Campbell himself had never committed a 
crime or that he was the one struggling financially.20 
Consequently, Campbell, still struggling to pay medical bills 
and unable to afford a headstone, buried his father in an 
unmarked grave.21 Ohio and Florida are two of six states that 
deny compensation funds to victims and their family members 
previously convicted of certain crimes.22   
This Note addresses the lack of remedies for victims who 
are denied compensation by their state’s victim compensation 
program. Following the introduction, Part II provides an 
overview and explores the history of victim compensation funds. 
Part III examines the criminal history ban. Part IV discusses 
the Supreme Court and Congress’ treatment of collateral 
consequences. This section considers Congress’ decision not to 
redress discrimination based on an individual’s criminal 
history. Part V presents evidence that the criminal history bans 
have a disparate impact on Black victims. Part VI analyzes the 
Supreme Court and Congress’ treatment of disparate impact 
challenges. Ultimately, this section will show that there is no 
remedy for the victims denied compensation despite the 
discriminatory effects of the bans. Part V explains why a 
solution is necessary. This Note concludes by suggesting that 
state legislatures redefine what it means to be an innocent 
victim. 
II.  Victim Compensation Funds 
A.  Overview 
As a result of crime, victims and their families may endure 
financial stress “as devastating as their physical injuries and 
emotional trauma.”23 Victims may have to pay for medical bills, 
 
 19. Davidson, supra note 13. 
 20. Santo I, supra note 1.  
 21. Florida Should Ease Restrictions on State Aid for Crime Victims: Our 
View, TCPALM (Sept. 19, 2018), perma.cc/X4YH-V6WN.  
 22. See Santo I, supra note 1 (including Ohio and Florida in the list of 
states that deny compensation based on the victim’s past).  
 23. Crime Victim Compensation: An Overview, supra note 9.  
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crime scene cleanup, funeral costs, physical therapy, mental 
health counseling, and many other expenses resulting from the 
crime.24 Although the court may order the perpetrator to 
compensate the victim for pecuniary losses,25 often the 
perpetrator cannot afford to pay the victim, and—if she is ever 
able to—it will not be until she is released from prison and able 
to find a job.26 To ensure the victim does not suffer further, 
legislatures have taken action and created victim compensation 
programs, offering crucial financial assistance to victims and 
their families.27 The legislature chooses which victims are 
reimbursed, what expenses are reimbursed, and how much to 
reimburse.28 Victim compensation programs most often help 
victims of physical and sexual assault—commonly including 
children.29 While money alone cannot make the victim whole 
again, this aid can be critical for recovery in the aftermath of 
crime.30  
 
 24. See id. (listing various expenses that victim compensation programs 
cover).  
 25. See In Brief: Victim Compensation Programs and Restitution, 
COUNCIL ST. GOV’T., perma.cc/33QK-WE8H (“Courts order restitution as part 
of a person’s sentence when the victim can demonstrate that he or she 
sustained pecuniary losses . . . as a result of the crime.”).  
 26. See id. (“The person ordered to pay restitution is expected to pay the 
full amount of restitution owed over the course of his or her sentence. 
Court-ordered restitution does not guarantee that the person ordered to pay it 
will do so . . . .”); Restitution, NAT’L CTR. FOR VICTIMS CRIME, perma.cc/H4PH-
PPAV (“Collection of restitution is often limited by the offender’s ability to pay. 
As a result, many victims wait years before they receive any restitution, and 
they may never receive the full amount of restitution ordered.”). 
 27. See Crime Victim Compensation: An Overview, supra note 9 (“Crime 
victim compensation programs across the country offer crucial financial 
assistance to victims of violence.”). 
 28. See DOUGLAS N. EVANS, COMPENSATING VICTIMS OF CRIME 1 (John Jay 
Coll. of Criminal Justice, 2014), perma.cc/7LV7-5B3E (PDF) (giving an 
overview of victim compensation programs).  
 29. See U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, OFFICE FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME REPORTS ON 
2015–2016 PROGRAMS AND SERVICES 1 (2017), https://perma.cc/422Z-NVQA 
(PDF) (“Victims were most often compensated for claims related to assault, 
child abuse (including sexual and physical abuse), and sexual assault.”). 
 30. Crime Victim Compensation: An Overview, supra note 9 (“Recovering 
from violence or abuse is difficult enough without having to worry about how 
to pay for the costs of medical care or counseling, or about how to replace lost 
income due to disability or death.”). 
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B.  History 
Government compensation for crime victims dates back to 
the Babylonian Code of Hammurabi (ca. 1775 B.C.).31 However, 
during the Middle Ages, government compensation for crime 
victims ceased.32 Courts instead ordered those who committed 
the crime to compensate their victims.33 Jeremy Bentham and 
Margery Fry revived interest in victim compensation in the 19th 
and 20th centuries.34 Fry became enraged in the 1950s when a 
court ordered two criminals to indemnify the victim of their 
crime and she calculated that the criminals would be able pay 
the full amount only if they lived another 442 years.35 Fry 
thought this was an injustice and started a movement for 
government-funded victim compensation when she expressed 
her outrage in a letter to the London Observer.36 She, and many 
 
 31. See G. R. DRIVER & JOHN C. MILES, THE BABYLONIAN LAWS 21 (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1955) (ordering the mayor of the territory where an unsolved 
robbery occurred to pay the victim whatever she had lost); LeRoy L. Lamborn, 
Propriety of Governmental Compensation of Victims of Crime, 41 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 446, 447–48 (1973) (discussing the Code of Hammurabi’s requirement 
for the government to compensate victims of crime). 
 32. See Christopher Bright, Tutorial: Introduction to Restorative Justice: 
Victim Compensation Fund, CTR. FOR JUST. & RECONCILIATION, 
perma.cc/4YQ9-6KVV (claiming that the rise of the nation-state was the 
reason for the diminishment of victim compensation).  
 33. See Lamborn, supra note 31, at 450 (“Traditional remedies in common 
law countries include different forms of restitution from the 
criminal— recovery through a civil action, by self-help, and as a prerequisite 
to leniency in the criminal process . . . .”).  
 34. See Bright, supra note 32 (specifying Jeremey Bentham and Margery 
Frys’ role in the revival of victim compensation); Julie Goldscheid, Crime 
Victim Compensation in a Post-9/11 World, 79 TUL. L. REV. 167, 181 (2004) 
(“British social reformer Margery Fry is widely credited for bringing public 
attention to victims’ needs for adequate compensation.”); Lamborn, supra note 
31, at 448 (stating that Margery Fry is responsible for the current focus on the 
government to compensate victims).  
 35. See Lamborn, supra note 31, at 448 (describing why Fry became 
“incensed” with the way victim’s compensation was ordered).  
 36. See id. (describing how Fry’s letter prompted a study of worldwide 
restitution systems and extensive debate in the British Parliament); 
Goldscheid, supra note 34, at 181 (“Fry’s articles were the impetus for public 
analysis and debate, which gave rise to a noted public symposium on 
compensation, a British government-sponsored study of worldwide restitution 
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others, believed that when the government “fails” to protect the 
victim, the government has a duty to make the victim “whole” 
again.37 Bentham observed:  
[T]hose who have suffered by [crime], either in their person 
or their fortune, are abandoned to their evil condition. The 
society which they have contributed to maintain, and which 
ought to protect them, owes them, however, an indemnity, 
when its protection has not been effectual.38  
Consequently, thanks to Bentham and Fry, government 
compensation programs were “revived” in the 20th century.39 In 
1964, New Zealand instituted the “first comprehensive program 
for governmental compensation of victims of crime.”40 The 
program was publicly funded and authorized compensation for 
expenses, pecuniary loss, and pain and suffering resulting from 
certain enumerated crimes.41 Britain followed suit the very next 
year.42  
Similarly, the interest in America grew out of “the liberal 
political philosophy of the early 1960s that government should 
provide security and protection for society’s vulnerable 
elements.”43 Concern for victims grew as the crime rate 
increased and the media publicized incidents of violence more 
frequently.44 Considering most violent crime victims were of a 
 
systems, and, subsequently, a British government White paper on victim 
compensation, which recommended enactment of a public program.”).  
 37. See Bright, supra note 32 (“[M]any advocates of compensation 
[programs] argue that since individuals have relinquished their rights to take 
justice into their own hands, government then is responsible for their 
protection. Crime represents a failure of that responsibility, for which the 
government ought to compensate victims.”).  
 38. 2 JEREMY BENTHAM, THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 579 (John 
Bowring ed., 1838).  
 39. See Bright, supra note 32 (analyzing the reintroduction of 
government compensation).  
 40. Lamborn, supra note 31, at 449. 
 41. See Goldscheid, supra note 34, at 181–82 (describing New Zealand’s 
crime victim compensation program). 
 42. See Lamborn, supra note 31, at 449 (“The following year the British 
government, without action by Parliament, promulgated a similar program.”).  
 43. Bright, supra note 32. 
 44. See id. (explaining why America’s crime victim compensation 
movement began).  
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low socioeconomic status, interest in victim compensation also 
grew as a “welfare and social control approach to dealing with 
the urban unrest of the 1960s.”45  Between 1965 and 1972, 
California, New York, Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts, and 
Alaska enacted legislation similar to New Zealand.46 Today, 
every state operates a victim compensation program.47  
C.  Allocation and Funding 
Each year, victim compensation funds across the country 
assist more than 200,000 victims and family members, 
amounting to nearly $500 million awarded annually.48 In most 
states, revenue for compensation funds comes from criminal 
fines, court fees, and forfeitures.49 Some states have come up 
with other creative ways to generate additional revenue for 
their programs. For example, Alaska requires “individuals 
convicted of felonies or multiple misdemeanors to forfeit their 
annual checks that all residents receive from the state oil 
fund.”50 Washington, D.C. funds its program through court 
revenues.51 Hawaii, Indiana, Kansas, Minnesota, Nebraska, 
and New Mexico draw a portion of inmate wages.52 Most states 
do not use tax dollars to fund their compensation programs.53 
 
 45. Id.  
 46. See Lamborn, supra note 31 (discussing the recent history of 
government victim compensation legislation).  
 47. See Goldscheid, supra note 34, at 182–83 (“[T]oday, all fifty states, 
the District of Columbia, and the Virgin Islands operate victim compensation 
programs.”).  
 48. See EVANS, supra note 28, at 4 (discussing the amount of assistance 
victim compensation programs give). 
 49. See In Brief: Victim Compensation Programs and Restitution, supra 
note 25 (“Funding for crime victim compensation programs typically comes 
from fines and fees collected from people convicted of crimes and people who 
receive traffic violations.”).  
 50. EVANS, supra note 28, at 4. 
 51. See id. (listing certain state’s sources of funding).  
 52. See id. (discussing how states generate revenue). 
 53. See OHIO ATTORNEY GEN.’S OFFICE, 2018 CRIME VICTIM SERVICES 
ANNUAL REPORT 1 (2018), perma.cc/UDW7-5LY5 (PDF) (stating that Ohio’s 
Victim of Crime Compensation fund is made up of “court costs and fees, not 
tax-payer dollars”); Crime Victim Compensation: An Overview, supra note 9 
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In addition, all state programs receive funding through the 
Federal Crime Victims Fund.54 This fund was created by the 
Victim of Crime Act of 1984 (VOCA).55 VOCA was designed to 
address the inability of the then-existing state programs to 
“adequately protect and assist” crime victims.56 Similar to state 
compensation funds, the Federal Crime Victims Fund generates 
revenue through criminal fines, forfeited appearance bonds, 
special forfeitures, and donations.57 No taxpayer dollars are 
used to finance the Fund.58 As of 2018, the Federal Crime 
Victims Fund had a balance of over twelve billion dollars.59 
Through the Fund, the federal government reimburses each 
state for 60 percent of all of the state’s eligible compensation 
payments for the prior year.60 In fiscal years 2015 and 2016, the 
Fund made state compensation payments to 468,729 victims 
throughout the nation for a total of $758,874,588.61 This 
amounts to approximately 37 percent of each state’s victim 
compensation fund.62  
 
(“Fittingly, most of this money comes from offenders rather than tax dollars, 
since a large majority of states fund their programs entirely through fees and 
fines charged against those convicted of crime.”).  
 54. Victim of Crime Act § 1402, 34 U.S.C. § 20101 (2018); see Crime 
Victim Compensation, RAINN, perma.cc/8668-E9J3 (explaining how the state 
victim compensation programs are funded).  
 55. See § 20101 (creating a fund to benefit victims of crime). 
 56. See Goldscheid, supra note 34, at 186 (discussing VOCA and its 
legislative history). 
 57. See § 20101 (listing the money to be deposited into the fund).  
 58. See Department of Justice Awards Over 2.3 Billion in Grants to Assist 
Victims Nationwide, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Oct. 29, 2019), perma.cc/9UCN-
6TEM (reviewing the Fund’s financing). 
 59. See Crime Victims Fund, OFF. FOR VICTIMS CRIME, perma.cc/J8LM-
852Y (reporting the Crime Victim Fund’s balance). 
 60. See OVC Fact Sheet, OFF. FOR VICTIMS CRIME, perma.cc/F5RU-EERQ 
 (describing how VOCA funds are allocated). 
 61. See 2017 OVC Report to the Nation: Formula Grants: VOCA 
Compensation and Assistance, OFF. FOR VICTIMS CRIME, perma.cc/K3GW-42UY 
(giving VOCA Compensation statistics). 
 62. See EVANS, supra note 28, at 4 (enumerating how much support states 
get from the Fund).  
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In certain states, funds are “chronically low” and there is 
barely enough funding to cover eligible claims.63 In other states, 
however, there is more than enough money in the fund, 
resulting in outstanding balances in compensation funds.64 In 
fiscal years 2013 and 2014, only eight states published their 
outstanding balances.65 Three states listed their leftover fund 
balances at less than $2 million.66 This includes Rhode Island, 
with a balance of $1,936,968 leftover at the start of fiscal year 
2013.67 Three states had balances between $2 million and $10 
million.68 Florida and Ohio had balances of over $10 million.69 
Similarly, in 2017 Florida’s compensation fund had an unused 
balance of $12 million and Ohio had $15 million.70  
To preserve this money and assist as many victims as 
possible, almost every state has a cap on the amount of 
compensation that can be awarded.71 New York and Iowa are 
the only states that have no limit on how much assistance 
victims can receive.72 California has the highest cap at 
$63,000.73 The national average maximum award is $26,000.74 
Although it varies from state to state, the average compensation 
 
 63. See Alysia Santo, For Black Crime Victims with Criminal Records, 
State Help is Hard to Come by, USA TODAY (Sept. 13, 2018, 7:00 AM), 
perma.cc/67RJ-DFMW [hereinafter Santo II] (discussing Louisiana’s fund 
which is “chronically short of money”). 
 64. See EVANS, supra note 28, at 4 (cataloguing the states that reported 
their outstanding balances). 
 65. See id. (listing the outstanding victim compensation fund balances in 
Alabama, Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Michigan, Ohio, and Rhode 
Island).  
 66. See id. (detailing each state’s outstanding balance).   
 67. See id. at 4 tbl.2 (enumerating Rhode Island’s outstanding balance).  
 68. See id. at 4 (specifying the balances in Arizona, Michigan, and 
Alabama).  
 69. See id. (noting that two states had balances of over $10 million).  
 70. See Santo II, supra note 63 (“But the funds in Florida and Ohio 
routinely close out the year with lots of leftover cash. Florida ended 2017 with 
a balance of $12 million and Ohio with $15 million.”). 
 71. See EVANS, supra note 28, at 5 (discussing the maximum amount of 
funding victims can receive in each state).  
 72. See id. (specifying New York and Iowa as the only states without a 
cap). 
 73. See id. (stating California’s victim compensation cap). 
 74. See id. (reporting the national maximum average).  
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per claim for the fiscal years of 2015 and 2016 was 
approximately $1,619.75  
The award may cover a wide variety of expenses. In general, 
states can choose which expenses to cover.76 However, to receive 
VOCA funding, federal law requires state programs to cover 
medical expenses resulting from physical injuries, mental 
health counseling, loss of wages, and funeral expenses.77 In 
addition, many states cover crime scene cleanup, moving 
expenses, attorneys fees, and rehabilitation.78 Hawaii and 
Tennessee also reimburse for the cost of pain and suffering.79 
New Jersey compensates victims for domestic services, 
including housecleaning, laundry, cooking, and other day-to-day 
support for the victim.80 New York and Washington reimburse 
victims for forensic exams needed after sexual assaults.81 Thus, 
if a victim needs help with one of these expenses, she can apply 
to the compensation fund. However, the claimant must first 
meet all of the state’s strict eligibility requirements.82 
D.  Eligibility 
Just as states are able to decide what expenses to 
compensate, states can also decide who to compensate.83 This 
decision is generally made by the state legislature through 
eligibility requirements listed in the state’s victim 
 
 75. See 2017 Report to the Nation, supra note 61 (announcing the average 
compensation per claim as $1,619, with homicide payouts averaging the most, 
at $3,217 per claim). 
 76. See Santo, supra note 1 (“States set their own eligibility rules.”); 
EVANS, supra note 28, at 4 tbl.2 (showing the differing compensable costs 
among various states).  
 77. See 34 U.S.C. § 20102 (2018) (listing the state program eligibility 
requirements).  
 78. See EVANS, supra note 28, at 7 (presenting the different expenses 
states will compensate).  
 79. See id. (showing that most states cover these costs). 
 80. See id. (demonstrating that only one state covers domestic services).  
 81. See id. (recording that only two states cover “forensic exams in sexual 
assaults”). 
 82. See infra Part II.D.  
 83. See supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
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compensation statute.84 The statute generally provides for the 
establishment of a board or agency to administer the program, 
review recommendations for awards, and determine the award 
in each particular case.85 The board or agency allocates funding 
based on whether or not the victim meets the state’s eligibility 
requirements.86 Although states differ in their exact eligibility 
requirements, most states have the same general criteria.87 For 
example, in order to receive VOCA funding—and all states 
do— states must follow certain eligibility requirements.88 
Requirements include mandated compensation for out-of-state 
victims, victims of federal crimes, and victims of criminal 
violence, including drunk driving and domestic violence.89  
Outside of the federally mandated requirements, common 
conditions consist of prompt reporting of the crime by the 
victim,90 filing of the claim in a specified period,91 and 
cooperation with the police and prosecutors in the investigation 
 
 84. See EVANS, supra note 28, app. at 25 (detailing common eligibility 
requirements). 
 85. See Andrea G. Nadel, Annotation, Statutes Providing for 
Governmental Compensation for Victims of Crime, 20 A.L.R. 4th 63 (1983) 
(describing how states generally set up their victim compensation programs).  
 86. See id. (discussing victim compensation programs); Santo I, supra 
note 1 (“Administrators of funds do not set out to discriminate. They must 
follow state law directing who can receive compensation.”).  
 87. See Nadel, supra note 85 (listing the typical requirements 
enumerated in state victim compensation statutes); Bright, supra note 32 
(“Certain basic features characterize most compensation funds . . . .”).  
 88. See 34 U.S.C. § 20102 (2018) (stating that grants are only awarded to 
“eligible” compensation programs). 
 89. See id. (listing compensable program requirements).  
 90. See Nadel, supra note 85 (including prompt reporting as a common 
requirement of state victim compensation statutes); see also N.C. GEN. 
STAT. § 15B-11 (2019) (denying compensation if the criminally injurious 
conduct was not reported to law enforcement within seventy-two hours of its 
occurrence); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-41-17 (2018) (same).  
 91. See Goldscheid, supra note 34, at 189 (“Applicants must . . . timely 
submit an application to the compensation program.”); see also ARK. CODE 
ANN. § 16-90-712 (2018) (“Reparations shall not be awarded [u]nless the claim 
has been filed with the Crime Victim Reparations Board within one year after 
the injury or death upon which the claim is based . . . .”); MISS. CODE ANN. 
§ 99-41-17 (2018) (requiring the claim to have been filed within thirty-six 
months after the crime occurred).  
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and prosecution of the crime.92 Additionally, many states 
require that the victim be “largely innocent,” meaning that she 
did not “precipitate the violent attack,”93 and was not 
perpetrating her own crime at the time of the incident.94 These 
basic requirements ensure that claimants were actually victims 
of the crime and did not have any involvement in the criminal 
wrongdoing that led to the injury.95  
Notably, victim compensation funds are a fund of “last 
resort.”96 Victims or their family members applying, therefore, 
must first exhaust all other sources of compensation, including 
insurance, workers compensation, and restitution, before the 
state will award them any money.97 If the claimant is receiving 
 
 92. See Goldscheid, supra note 34, at 189 (discussing the common 
requirements for victim compensation eligibility); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-712 
(2018) (denying or reducing award of reparations if the victim has not fully 
cooperated with “appropriate law enforcement agencies”). This requirement 
can also have a disparate impact on minority communities who are hesitant 
to approach the police. See L. Strong Richardson, Implicit Racial Bias and 
Racial Anxiety: Implications for Stops and Frisks, 15 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 73, 
84–88 (2017) (explaining the Black community’s mistrust of the police).  
 93. Bright, supra note 32; see MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-41-17 (2018) 
(reducing compensation to the degree the victim was responsible for the injury 
or death); FLA. STAT. § 960.065 (2019) (denying funding from victims who 
committed or aided in the commission of the crime upon which the claim is 
based).  
 94. See FLA. STAT. § 960.065 (2019) (stating that victims who were 
engaged in unlawful activity at the time of the crime they were the victim of 
are ineligible to receive funding); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.60 (LexisNexis 
2019) (specifying that victims who committed a felony or were engaged in any 
similar conduct that would constitute a felony are ineligible to receive 
funding); see also Jill Web, Oklahoma Victim Compensation Program 
Disproportionately Denies Funds for Black Victims, ACLU (July 31, 2019, 4:30 
PM), perma.cc/9KCM-CWHP (discussing how this requirement has negatively 
affected Black victims and their ability to receive compensation due to alleged 
membership in a gang). 
 95. See Crime Victim Compensation: An Overview, supra note 9 
(“Generally the victim must . . . not have committed a criminal act or some 
substantially wrongful act that contributed to the crime (the eligibility of the 
family members generally depends on the behavior of the victim when 
programs assess this requirement).”). 
 96. Goldscheid, supra note 34, at 190. 
 97. See id. (“Every state regards its victim compensation program as the 
‘payer[] of last resort,’ so that the program will only pay expenses that are not 
covered by other sources.”).  
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money that will cover these expenses in any other way, she 
cannot receive state compensation.98 In addition, some 
programs have “means tests” which “prohibit recovery to those 
who will still be financially secure in the absence of 
compensation.”99 The programs, thus, truly are in place to 
compensate those who need the money the most.  
III.    The Criminal History Ban: Defining the “Innocent Victim” 
A. Overview of the Ban 
Despite the importance of the victim compensation 
programs and the true need of the victims involved, some states 
choose to impose an additional requirement to receive 
compensation. Arkansas, Florida, Mississippi, North Carolina, 
Ohio, and Rhode Island all deny compensation to victims who 
have been convicted of certain felonies.100 Each state varies as 
to what exactly it bans.101 For example, Florida denies 
compensation to anyone who has been convicted of a forcible 
felony or adjudicated as a habitual felony offender, a habitual 
violent offender, or a violent career criminal.102 Forcible felonies 
include treason, car-jacking, robbery, burglary, and “any other 
felony which involves the use or threat of physical force or 
violence against any individual.”103 Low-level burglary is among 
the most common reasons Florida denies individuals with a 
 
 98. See Nadel, supra note 90 (“Many of the compensation statutes 
prohibit making any award unless the victim would otherwise suffer ‘financial 
hardship’ . . . .”).   
 99. Bright, supra note 32.  
 100. See Santo I, supra note 1 (stating that Arkansas, Florida, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, Ohio, North Carolina, and Rhode Island are the only states to ban 
compensation based on a victim’s criminal history). But see Alysia Santo, More 
Families of Murder Victims in Louisiana Will Qualify for Financial Help, 
MARSHALL PROJECT (June 10, 2019, 6:01 AM), perma.cc/H2CG-DS3Z 
[hereinafter Santo III] (“Louisiana lawmakers unanimously passed legislation 
that prohibits the state’s Crime Victim Reparations Board from denying an 
application for financial assistance because of a victim’s criminal history.”).  
 101. See Santo I, supra note 1 (detailing each state’s specific ban). 
 102. See FLA. STAT. § 960.065 (2019) (listing the state’s eligibility 
requirements).  
 103. Id.  § 776.08.  
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criminal history.104 In addition, Florida will not compensate 
anyone who was in custody at the time of the crime upon which 
compensation is based “regardless of conviction.”105 This means 
that if someone was wrongfully arrested and became a victim of 
a crime while in custody, she could not receive compensation. 
Arkansas denies claimants if the victim was injured or killed 
while confined in a correctional facility “as a result of [a] 
conviction of any crime.”106 Arkansas also will not compensate 
claimants who have been convicted of any felony “involving 
criminally injurious conduct.”107 Mississippi takes it one step 
further and denies compensation to “any claimant or victim who 
has been under the actual or constructive supervision of a 
department of corrections for a felony conviction.”108 Moreover, 
Mississippi bans victims or claimants who, “subsequent to the 
injury for which the application is made, [are] convicted of any 
felony.”109  
Additionally, the states vary as to how long their ban 
lasts.110 For example, Arkansas and Florida have lifetime 
bans.111 This means that someone, like Antonio Mason, who 
makes a mistake as a teenager will continue to be punished for 
that mistake if he is victimized at ninety.112 Or, someone like 
Anthony Campbell, who needed to pay for his father’s funeral, 
will be punished for a crime his father committed thirty-two 
years earlier, despite turning his life around.113 Other states, 
however, have dramatically shorter bans. For example, the bans 
 
 104. See Santo I, supra note 1 (discussing Florida’s refusal to remove 
low-level burglaries from the list of disqualifying felonies).  
 105. FLA. STAT. § 960.065. 
 106. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-712 (2019). 
 107. Id. 
 108. MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-41-17 (2019). 
 109. Id. (emphasis added).  
 110. See Santo I, supra note 1 (listing how long each state’s ban lasts). 
 111. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-712 (giving no time limit to how long the 
felony can be considered); FLA. STAT. § 960.065 (same). 
 112. See supra notes 1–12 and accompanying text. 
 113. See supra notes 13–21 and accompanying text.  
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in Mississippi and Rhode Island last five years.114 North 
Carolina’s ban lasts three years.115  
In contrast, several other states and the federal government 
have put limited bans on people previously convicted of certain 
crimes.116 For example, VOCA denies funds to victims who have 
been convicted of any federal crime and have not paid their 
fines, other monetary penalties, or restitution imposed for the 
offense.117 In addition, Illinois will not compensate a person 
convicted of a felony “until that person is discharged from 
probation or is released from a correctional institution and has 
been discharged from parole or mandatory supervised released, 
if any.”118 The victim can apply for compensation, but she will 
not receive her reward until she meets the requirements stated 
above.119 Although not ideal requirements, the states with 
limited bans allow the victim to receive funding eventually.120 
States with the full criminal history ban, on the other hand, do 
not.121 If the victim is disqualified in Ohio, Florida, Arkansas, 
 
 114. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-41-17 (considering felonies that occurred 
within five years prior to the injury or death for which application has been 
made); 12 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-25-19 (2019) (same). 
 115. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15B-11 (2019) (stating claimants who have been 
convicted of certain felonies within three years of when the victim’s injury 
occurred will be denied). 
 116. See EVANS, supra note 28, app. B at 25 (demonstrating that thirteen 
states have some sort of limit on individuals convicted of felonies).  
 117. See 34 U.S.C. § 20102 (2018) (prohibiting state programs that receive 
funding from the Crime Victims Funds from compensating victims who have 
been convicted of federal crimes and are delinquent on their monetary 
penalties).  
 118. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/2.5 (2019). 
 119. See id. (“A victim who has been convicted of a felony may apply for 
assistance under this Act at any time but no award of compensation may be 
considered until the applicant meets the requirements of this Section.”).  
 120. See id. (stating the victim can receive funding once she is discharged 
from probation or mandatory supervised release); 34 U.S.C. § 20102 
(prohibiting compensation to victims who have been convicted of a crime only 
when they are delinquent in paying their fines); see also EVANS, supra note 28, 
at 25 app. B (distinguishing between states that have criminal history bans 
“for a specified time” and those that ban only during probation or parole).  
 121. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-712 (2019) (denying claimants previously 
convicted of certain felonies with no way to cure the denial); FLA. STAT. 
§ 960.065 (2019) (same).  
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Mississippi, Rhode Island, or North Carolina, she will never 
receive state victim compensation for her current injuries.122  
B.  Ohio’s Victim Compensation Fund 
Similar to the criminal history bans discussed above, Ohio’s 
victim compensation board will distribute funds neither to a 
victim nor a claimant who has been “convicted of a felony within 
ten years prior to the criminally injurious conduct that gave rise 
to the claim or is convicted of a felony during the pendency of 
the claim.”123 Ohio, however, also takes its ban one step further. 
Ohio prohibits a claimant from receiving victim compensation if 
it is  
proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the victim or 
the claimant engaged, within ten years prior to the 
criminally injurious conduct that gave rise to the claim or 
during the pendency of the claim, in an offense of violence, a 
violation of [Ohio’s drug trafficking laws], or any 
substantially similar offense that also would constitute a 
felony under the laws of [Ohio], another state, or the United 
States.124 
This means that people who were acquitted of or suspected 
but not charged of certain felonies are likewise prohibited from 
receiving compensation in Ohio.125 Simply put, Ohio’s ban may 
be punishing victims that have no criminal record at all. This 
standard also means that juvenile records, which are technically 
not convictions, disqualify victims.126  
Ohio was not always this exclusive when it came to victim 
compensation. These requirements were “fueled by outrage over 
 
 122. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15B-11 (2019) (denying the claimant for felonies 
committed within three years of the injury).  
 123. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.60 (LexisNexis 2019). 
 124. Id.  (emphasis added). 
 125. See Santo I, supra note 1 (“[Ohio’s] ban would apply not just to people 
with convictions but also to people whose records show a ‘preponderance of the 
evidence’ that they may have committed a felony in cases involving violence 
or drug trafficking.”).  
 126. See In re Miller, 698 N.E.2d 124, 136 (Ohio Ct. Cl. 1996) (upholding 
the denial of an applicant to victims compensation due to his juvenile record 
because even though a juvenile cannot be convicted of a felony, “his conduct 
could be considered felonious” (emphasis in original)).  
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a reputed mobster.”127 In 1977, John Nardi, an alleged associate 
of the Cleveland crime family, was killed by a car bomb.128 
Despite his notorious reputation, Nardi had never been 
convicted of a crime.129 His widow applied to the crime victim 
compensation fund and collected $50,000 in victim 
compensation.130 “The backlash was fierce. Lawmakers 
unsuccessfully sued the attorney general to block the payment 
and, by 1982, the first version of Ohio’s felony restriction law 
sailed through the legislature.”131  
However, Ohio’s legislation fails to consider that not every 
person who may have committed or did commit certain felonies 
is a notorious mobster.132 This ban is not harming the “John 
Nardis” of the world, but is actually affecting people like Antonio 
Mason who have turned their lives around and have now fallen 
victim to crime.133 In fact, drug possession is among the most 
common reasons people with a criminal history are denied funds 
in Ohio.134 Further, regardless of what the bans were intended 
to prevent, their current effect is indisputable: the bans place an 
additional sentence on individuals who have already paid for 
their crime, disproportionately impacting Black victims.135  
IV.  The Constitution, Congress, and Collateral Consequences   
A criminal conviction can carry with it a wide range of 
“collateral consequences” that disqualify individuals from 
various aspects of society even after they have served their 
 
 127.  Santo I, supra note 1.  
 128. See id. (discussing John Nardi’s accident).  
 129. See id. (detailing John Nardi’s impact on Ohio’s criminal history ban).  
 130. See id. (explaining Ohio’s decision to ban certain victims from 
receiving compensation).  
 131. Id.  
 132. See supra Part I.   
 133. See supra notes 1–12 and accompanying text.   
 134. See Santo I, supra note 1 (stating that drug possession accounts for 
twenty percent of disqualifications).  
 135. See infra Parts IV, V. 
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sentence.136 Examples of collateral consequences include felony 
disenfranchisement, restricted access to employment and, at 
issue here, criminal history bans.137 The criminal history ban 
allows states to continue to punish previously incarcerated 
victims by prohibiting them from receiving aid in their most 
crucial time of need.138 Despite this harsh effect, neither the 
Constitution nor Congress protects victims from the 
discrimination that stems from a criminal conviction.139  
A.  Collateral Consequences and the Fourteenth Amendment  
The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that “[n]o state 
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges 
or immunities of citizens of the United States . . . nor deny to 
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws.”140 Thus, the Constitution requires that the government 
treat all citizens equally.141 Some distinctions, however, are 
necessary for a functional society.142 For example, a regulation 
prohibiting children under five from flying an airplane is 
 
 136. See Margaret Colgate Love, Managing Collateral Consequences in the 
Sentencing Process: The Revised Sentencing Articles of the Model Penal Code, 
2015 WIS. L. REV. 247, 252 (2015) (“A criminal conviction carries with it a wide 
variety of statutory and regulatory penalties and restrictions in addition to 
the sentence imposed by the court. These so-called ‘collateral consequences’ of 
conviction are frequently more punitive and long lasting than court-imposed 
sanctions like a prison term or fine.”). 
 137. See Nora V. Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile: The Need for 
Restrictions on Collateral Sentencing Consequences, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 
153, 156–57 (1999) (discussing collateral consequences that impact political, 
economic, and social spheres of life).  
 138. See Deborah N. Archer & Kele S. Williams, Making America “The 
Land of Second Chances”: Restoring Socioeconomic Rights for Ex-Offenders, 
30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 527, 539 (2006) (explaining how denying 
public assistance to previously incarcerated individuals can be detrimental). 
 139. See infra Part IV.A–B.  
 140. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  
 141. See Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Wakefield, 247 U.S. 350, 352 (1918) 
(“The purpose of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is 
to secure every person within the State’s jurisdiction against intentional and 
arbitrary discrimination . . . .”).  
 142. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 473 (1991) (upholding a 
mandatory retirement provision because it is rational to conclude some mental 
deterioration occurs at age seventy). 
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necessary for the safety of our society and should be upheld.143 
Distinctions based on race, sex, or national origin, on the other 
hand, should be struck down unless pressing public necessity 
requires it.144 The Supreme Court, therefore, must distinguish 
between classifications that are necessary to society and 
constitutional, and those classifications that are discriminatory 
and unconstitutional.145 The Court does this by applying 
different standards of review for different classifications.146  
If a statute makes a distinction based on a protected class, 
the Court will apply strict scrutiny to determine whether or not 
the statute violates the Equal Protection Clause.147 To survive 
judicial review under strict scrutiny, the state must prove that 
the racial classification is “narrowly tailored” to serve a 
“compelling government interest.”148 This standard necessitates 
a rigorous review that makes it very difficult for legislation to 
survive.149  
The purpose of strict scrutiny is to ‘smoke out’ illegitimate 
uses of race by assuring that the legislative body is pursuing 
a goal important enough to warrant use of a highly suspect 
tool. The test also ensures that the means chosen “fit” this 
 
 143. See 14 C.F.R. § 61.305 (2020) (requiring pilots to be at least seventeen 
years old). 
 144. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (concluding that 
classifications based on a suspect class must be reviewed with rigid scrutiny 
but can be upheld if necessary to national security).   
 145. See Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976) (applying 
rational basis review because neither a protected class nor a fundamental 
right was involved). 
 146. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) 
(noting that statutes that make distinctions affecting religious, national, or 
racial minorities may call for a “more searching judicial inquiry”).  
 147. See Murgia, 427 U.S. at 312. (“[E]qual protection analysis requires 
strict scrutiny of a legislative classification only when the 
classification . . . operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class.”).  
 148. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 
701, 720 (2007) (citation omitted). 
 149. See id. at 720 (“[R]acial classifications are simply too pernicious to 
permit any but the most exact connection between justification and 
classification.” (citation omitted)); Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 570 U.S. 297, 309 
(2013) (“Strict scrutiny is a searching examination, and it is the government 
that bears the burden to prove ‘that the reasons for any [racial] classification 
[are] clearly identified and unquestionably legitimate.’” (alteration in original) 
(emphasis added) (citation omitted)). 
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compelling goal so closely that there is little or no possibility 
that the motive for the classification was illegitimate racial 
prejudice or stereotype.150  
Thus, if a plaintiff can show that a statute or policy makes a 
distinction based on a protected class, her chances of success are 
high.151  
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has determined that 
felons are not a protected class.152 If a statute or government 
action makes a distinction based on an unprotected or 
non-suspect class, rational basis review applies.153 A statute or 
government action is upheld under rational basis if it has a 
“rational relation to some legitimate end.”154 Although courts 
must consider the means and the ends of the statute or policy, 
the rational basis standard has been described as 
“meaningless,”155 “almost empty,”156 and “enormously 
deferential.”157 In fact, under rational basis review, courts do not 
 
 150. Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989).  
 151. See Stylianos-Ioannis G. Koutnatzis, Affirmative Action in Education: 
The Trust and Honesty Perspective, 7 TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 187, 211 n.106 
(2002) (“In short, as long as strict scrutiny applies, results are overwhelmingly 
fatal.”). 
 152. See Crook v. El Paso Indep. Sch. Dist., 277 F. App’x 477, 480 (5th Cir. 
2008) (concluding that felons are not a suspect class); see also Kay Kohler, The 
Revolving Door: The Effect of Employment Discrimination Against 
Ex-Prisoners, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 1403, 1420 (1975) (arguing that convicted 
felons should be considered a suspect class due to their history of unequal 
treatment, the disabilities they face at reentry, and their political 
powerlessness). 
 153. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996) (stating that legislative 
classifications that do not target a protected class will receive rational basis 
review). 
 154. Id.  
 155. Richard E. Levy, Escaping Lochner’s Shadow: Toward a Coherent 
Jurisprudence of Economic Rights, 73 N.C. L. REV. 329, 426 (1995). 
 156. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Rational Basis Test is Constitutional (and 
Desirable), 14 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 401, 410 (2016). 
 157. Id. at 402; see Turner v. Glickman, 207 F.3d 419, 424 (7th Cir. 2000) 
(“Rational basis review ‘is not a license for courts to judge the wisdom, 
fairness, or logic of legislative choices. Rather, we must uphold the challenged 
classification if ‘there is a rational relationship between the disparity of 
treatment and some legitimate government purpose.’” (internal citations 
omitted)); FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993) (concluding that 
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even require that the legislature give a reason for enacting the 
statute.158 A statute “must be upheld against equal protection 
challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts 
that could provide a rational basis for the classification.”159 
Challenging the criminal history bans because they treat felons 
differently from non-felons, therefore, is unlikely to be 
successful.160  
Another way that a statute can receive strict scrutiny is if 
a fundamental right is involved.161 To be considered a 
fundamental right, the right at issue must be deeply rooted in 
tradition and history.162 Fundamental rights include the right 
to marriage,163 the right to the custody of your children,164 and 
the right to control the education of your children.165 
Regrettably, the Supreme Court concluded that access to 
welfare is not a fundamental right.166 Further, the Court has 
 
under rational basis review, a statutory classification must be upheld if there 
is “any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis 
for the classification” (emphasis added)); Romer, 517 U.S. at 632 (“In the 
ordinary case, a law will be sustained if it can be said to advance a legitimate 
government interest, even if the law seems unwise or works to the 
disadvantage of a particular group, or if the rationale for it seems tenuous.”). 
 158. See Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955) 
(upholding a statute under rational basis review even though the state 
legislature did not give a reason for its enactment). 
 159. Beach Commc’ns, 508 U.S. at 313.  
 160. See infra notes 170–174 and accompanying text.  
 161. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (requiring heightened 
protection against government interference with “certain fundamental rights” 
(internal citation omitted)).  
 162. See id. at 65–66 (analyzing the history of the right before concluding 
it is fundamental); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (same); Meyer v. 
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923) (same).  
 163. See Loving, 388 U.S. at 12 (“Marriage is one of the ‘basic civil rights 
of man,’ fundamental to our very existence and survival.” (internal citation 
omitted)).  
 164. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 66 (recognizing the fundamental right of 
parents to make decisions concerning the “care, custody, and control” of their 
children).  
 165. See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 400 (concluding that parents have a 
Constitutional right to control the education of their children).  
 166. See Lavine v. Milne, 424 U.S. 577, 584 n.9 (1976) (stating that the 
government is not Constitutionally obligated to provide minimum levels of 
support). 
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granted a “strong presumption of constitutionality” when 
legislatures are conferring monetary benefits because it believes 
that legislatures should have “discretion in deciding how to 
expend necessarily limited resources.”167 Applying these 
principles, courts have upheld the denial of food stamps for 
individuals convicted of drug felonies168 and the suspension of 
Social Security benefits for incarcerated individuals.169  
Under these lenient standards, it is unlikely that a court 
will strike down a state law that considers criminal history 
when allocating monetary benefits such as victim 
compensation.170 In fact, the criminal history ban in Ohio has 
been challenged as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause 
multiple times to no avail.171 The challengers alleged that the 
ban violated equal protection of the law because it treated felons 
differently than non-felons.172 The Ohio Supreme Court 
concluded that the “rationale to conserve governmental 
resources by generally excluding persons associated with crime 
is apparent on the face of the law.”173 The court stated that 
“conserving scarce resources is a legitimate purpose, and 
excluding persons convicted or otherwise shown to have 
committed felonies promotes that purpose.”174 Accordingly, if 
 
 167. Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 238 (1981).  
 168. See Turner v. Glickman, 207 F.3d 419, 425 (7th Cir. 2000) (upholding 
a law that disqualified drug felons from receiving food stamps because there 
was a rational connection between the disqualification and the government’s 
interest in deterring drug use). 
 169. See Butler v. Apfel, 144 F.3d 622, 625 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that 
suspending Social Security benefits is rationally related to the state’s desire 
to conserve scarce resources). 
 170. See Houston v. Williams, 547 F.3d 1357, 1353 (11th Cir. 2008) (“This 
court, among others, has held that denying convicted felons certain 
entitlements does not violate the Equal Protection Clause.”).  
 171. See State ex rel. Matz v. Brown, 525 N.E.2d 805, 807 (Ohio 1988) 
(concluding that prohibiting felons from receiving funding under Ohio’s 
Victims Crime Act did not violate the Equal Protections Clause of the Ohio or 
the United States Constitution); In re Crowan, 499 N.E.2d 937, 943 (Ohio Ct. 
Cl. 1986) (same); State ex rel. Madden v. Brown, 519 N.E.2d 865 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1987) (same).  
 172. State ex rel. Matz, 525 N.E.2d at 806.  
 173. Id. at 807.  
 174. Id. 
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individuals previously convicted of felonies are to receive 
redress, it must come from the legislature. 
B.  Congress’s Acceptance of Collateral Consequences  
Congress does not protect individuals convicted of felonies 
from being discriminated against as a result of their criminal 
history. In fact, Congress actively prohibits individuals 
convicted of certain felonies from benefitting from welfare 
programs.175 For example, federal law bans any person 
convicted of a drug felony from receiving food stamps.176 
Individuals convicted of drug trafficking can be ineligible for all 
federal benefits for five years.177 After two convictions, the 
individual can be made ineligible for all federal benefits for ten 
years.178 After three convictions, the individual is permanently 
ineligible for all federal benefits.179 Additionally, people 
convicted of drug offenses are excluded from the receipt of 
grants, contracts, licenses, and loans, including federal 
education and small business loans.180  These policy decisions 
are defended as a way to deter drug abuse and reduce welfare 
fraud.181 For example, Congress prohibits individuals convicted 
of drug offenses from receiving food stamps because Congress 
believes they are likely to sell their food stamps in exchange for 
drugs or cash to buy drugs.182  
 
 175. See Demleitner, supra note 137, at 158 (“A number of welfare support 
programs explicitly exclude certain types of offenders from their coverage.”).  
 176. 21 U.S.C. § 862 (2018). However, states may opt out of this ban 
through their own legislation. Id.  
 177. Id.  
 178. Id.  
 179. Id.  
 180. See Demleitner, supra note 137, at 158 (describing the various ways 
individuals with a criminal history are excluded from social and welfare 
rights).  
 181. See Turner v. Glickman, 207 F.3d 419, 425–26 (7th Cir. 2000) 
(discussing the constitutionality of exempting felons from the Food Stamps 
Act). 
 182. See id. (“The legislative record in this case contains testimony that 
food stamps were being traded for drugs.” (citing H.R. REP. NO. 104-651, at 68 
(1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2183, 2202)).  
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These defenses do not apply to victim compensation 
benefits and Congress recognized this by treating victim 
compensation programs differently than other welfare 
programs. Congress specifically denied individuals convicted of 
drug felonies eligibility in both federal and state food stamp 
programs.183 In contrast, Congress provided federal funding 
both directly to victims with a criminal history and to states that 
compensate victims with a criminal history.184 By doing so, 
Congress defined “victim” to include those with a criminal 
record, consistent with its mission to “enhanc[e] the Nation’s 
capacity to assist crime victims and to provid[e] leadership in 
changing attitudes, policies, and practices to promote justice 
and healing for all victims of crime.”185 Banning victims because 
of their criminal history would run contrary to that mission.186 
Nonetheless, despite not actively banning individuals because 
of their criminal history, Congress does not protect victims from 
states that choose to do so.187 Congress allocates funds to the 
states that deny victims based on their criminal history and has 
not enacted legislation prohibiting this discrimination.188 The 
many victims affected by the criminal history bans, therefore, 
are left with nowhere to turn.  
 
 183. See 21 U.S.C. § 862a (stating that individuals with drug felonies are 
not eligible to receive assistance from federal or state food stamp programs). 
 184. See 34 U.S.C. § 20102 (allowing compensation for individuals with a 
criminal record). 
 185. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME REPORTS ON 
2015–2016 PROGRAMS AND SERVICES 1 (2017), perma.cc/8489-9APB (PDF) 
(emphasis added).  
 186. See Santo I, supra note 1 (advocating for states to expand their 
definition of victim).  
 187. See § 20102 (failing to prohibit states from denying compensation 
from victims based on their criminal history).  
 188. See supra notes 54–62 and accompanying text. 
  
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCE  1345 
 
V.  The Disparate Impact of the Criminal History Ban on 
Black Victims 
To make matters worse, the criminal history bans 
disproportionately affect Black victims.189 The Marshall Project, 
Reveal from the Center for Investigative Reporting, and USA 
TODAY analyzed the criminal history ban in Ohio and 
Florida.190 The study demonstrated that in Florida only 30 
percent of people who listed their race when applying for victim 
compensation in 2015 and 2016 were Black.191 However, Black 
applicants made up for 61 percent of people denied aid for 
having a criminal record.192 The analysis revealed similar 
results in Ohio. In 2016, 42 percent of applicants who listed 
their race were Black.193 Yet, 61 percent of victims denied 
because of their criminal history were Black.194 The results are 
clear. The criminal history ban disproportionately affects Black 
victims. 
Although the research only examined two of the six states 
with the ban, considering the “racial disparity that pervades the 
U.S. criminal justice system,”195 it is likely that the results 
would be similar in any state that bans victims based on their 
criminal history.196  
 
 189. It is possible that this ban disproportionately affects other minority 
victims, including Latinx individuals. See THE SENTENCING PROJECT, REPORT 
TO THE UNITED NATIONS ON RACIAL DISPARITIES IN THE U.S. CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
SYSTEM 1 (2018), perma.cc/VT2E-RGSU (PDF) (stating that Hispanics are 3.1 
times more likely to be incarcerated than Whites). However, detailed reports 
have only discussed the ban’s effect on Black victims. See Santo I, supra note 
1 (reporting only how the ban affects Black victims).  
 190. See Santo I, supra note 1 (presenting the racial disparity revealed in 
the study).   
 191. See id. (relating the results of the study).  
 192. See id. (explaining that Black applicants make up over half of the 
those denied because of the criminal history ban, despite being less than 
one-third of applicants). 
 193. See id. (discussing the “similar racial disparity” in Ohio).  
 194. See id. (recounting Ohio’s victim compensation statistics).  
 195. THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 189, at 1. 
 196. See id. at 9 (“African Americans—particularly [B]lack men—are most 
exposed to the collateral consequences associated with a criminal record.”).  
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African Americans are more likely than [W]hite Americans 
to be arrested; once arrested, they are more likely to be 
convicted; and once convicted . . . they are more likely to 
experience lengthy prison sentences. African-American 
adults are 5.9 times as likely to be incarcerated than 
[W]hites . . . . As of 2001, one of every three [B]lack boys born 
in that year could expect to go to prison in his 
lifetime . . . compared to one of every seventeen [W]hite 
boys.197 
Black Americans account for 40 percent of the current prison 
population, while making up only 12 percent of the U.S. 
population.198 The source of this disparity is “deeper and more 
systematic than explicit racial discrimination.”199 What might 
appear to be a linkage between race and crime may actually be 
the result of institutionalized racism.200  
 The “discriminatory implementation of the police and 
judicial practices” carried out for the past two decades have 
greatly contributed to the disparity.201 For example, although 
drug offenses are committed at roughly equal rates across races, 
a Black person is 3.7 times more likely to be arrested for 
marijuana possession than a White person.202 This can be 
attributed to police prioritizing contact with low-income 
neighborhoods, where African Americans are also 
disproportionately represented.203 The fact that the criminal 
ban in Ohio affects Black victims more often, therefore, is 
unsurprising, considering that most claimants in Ohio are 
 
 197. Id. at 1.  
 198. See Cecil J. Hunt II, The Jim Crow Effect: Denial, Dignity, Human 
Rights, and Racialized Mass Incarceration, 29 J.C.R. & ECON. DEV. 15, 15 
(2016) (describing the intersection of race and mass incarceration).  
 199. THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 189, at 1. 
 200. See Hunt II, supra note 198, at 29 (“The social turn to racialized mass 
incarceration has become an institutionalized racial dynamic within our 
criminal justice system.”).  
 201. Id.   
 202. See THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 189, at 3–4 (explaining how 
higher levels of police contact with African Americans has contributed to racial 
disparity in the criminal justice system).  
 203. See id. at 3 (“Absent meaningful efforts to address societal 
segregation and disproportionate levels of poverty, U.S. criminal justice 
policies have cast a dragnet targeting African Americans.”).  
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denied because of simple drug possession.204 Similarly, it has 
been shown in recent years that Black drivers are somewhat 
more likely to be stopped than White drivers and “far more 
likely” to be searched and arrested.205 The causes and outcomes 
of these stops “point[ ] to unchecked racial bias, whether 
intentional or not, in officer discretion.”206 Thus, any categorical 
ban on individuals with a criminal history will negatively affect 
Black victims.207  
Racial disparity permeates every stage of the criminal 
justice system and, in the six states that have a criminal history 
ban, the state legislatures have allowed the racial disparity to 
pervade their victim compensation programs as well.208 Despite 
the government implementing victim compensation programs to 
protect and assist victims, these state governments have left 
society’s most vulnerable victims unprotected.209 Unable to turn 
to their state governments for help, minority victims have to 
turn to the federal government to strike down the bans. 
Unfortunately, as discussed in the next section, these victims 
and their families are left with no redress.210  
VI.  Current Disparate Impact Remedies Offer Victims No 
Solution 
A.  Disparate Impact and the Fourteenth Amendment 
As discussed in Part IV, the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment requires the government to make laws 
impartially, without drawing distinctions based on 
 
 204. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.  
 205. See THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 189, at 3–5 (discussing 
policies that impose great costs on people of color and bring little gain in crime 
reduction).  
 206. Id. at 5.  
 207. See id. at 10 (stating that because of the disparate racial effects of the 
criminal justice system people of color are disproportionately impacted by 
exclusionary laws). 
 208. See supra notes 190–196 and accompanying text.  
 209. See supra Part IV.  
 210. See infra Part VI. 
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impermissible characteristics.211 The “central purpose” of this 
clause is to prevent state officials from discriminating on the 
basis of race.212 Thus, statutes that draw distinctions based on 
race are reviewed under strict scrutiny.213  
There are two types of racial classifications that compel 
strict scrutiny: facially discriminatory classifications and 
facially neutral classifications.214 If a statute explicitly draws a 
distinction based on race, the statute is facially 
discriminatory.215 An example of such a statute is one that 
provides for separate railways carriages for White and colored 
races.216 To invoke strict scrutiny, the plaintiff only must prove 
that the statute, on its face, treats one race differently than 
another.217 If a statute does not explicitly make a distinction 
based on race, but nonetheless has a discriminatory impact, the 
statute is facially neutral.218 An example of such a policy was at 
 
 211. See supra Part IV.A.   
 212. See Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 867 (2017) (“The 
central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to eliminate racial 
discrimination emanating from official sources in the States.” (citations 
omitted)).   
 213. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326–27 (2003) (“[A]ll 
governmental uses of race are subject to strict scrutiny . . . .”). 
 214. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 297–99 (1986) (reviewing a 
state policy that was neutral on its face but had a discriminatory effect); see 
also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (examining a statute that facially 
discriminated on the basis of race).  
 215. See Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 509 (2005) (concluding that 
the California Department of Correction’s policy of using race to determine cell 
assignments for newly transferred inmates was an “express racial 
classification”); Loving, 388 U.S. at 11 (holding that Virginia’s miscegenation 
statutes rested “solely upon” racial classifications). 
 216. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 543 (1896) (explaining the legal 
distinction involved in such “separate but equal” statutes), overruled by Brown 
v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).  
 217. See Johnson, 543 U.S. at 506 (“We therefore apply strict scrutiny to 
all racial classifications to ‘smoke out’ illegitimate uses of race by assuring 
that [government] is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a 
highly suspect tool.” (emphasis in original) (alteration in original) (citation 
omitted)).  
 218. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241 (1976) 
This is not to say that the necessary discriminatory racial purpose 
must be express or appear on the face of the statute, or that a law’s 
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issue in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,219 where a power plant 
required that all employees either have a high school diploma 
or pass an intelligence test.220 The requirement, neutral on its 
face, had a negative impact on minorities, who were less likely 
to have graduated high school.221 To invoke strict scrutiny for a 
facially neutral statute, the plaintiff must prove that the statute 
has not only a discriminatory impact, but also a discriminatory 
purpose.222 Thus, to invoke strict scrutiny for a statute like the 
one involved in Griggs, minority applicants would have to prove 
that the factory owners implemented the requirement with the 
intention of discriminating against minorities.223  
Discriminatory purpose can be proven by statistics of 
discriminatory effect or through legislative history. To 
successfully utilize statistics, the statistics “must present a 
‘stark’ pattern” of discrimination.224 Statistical evidence has 
only been accepted in “certain limited contexts.”225 The Supreme 
Court accepts statistical disparities in the selection of jury 
venire in a particular district and in the form of 
“multiple-regression analysis to prove statutory violations 
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.”226 
Discrimination in the allocation of victim compensation funds 
does not fall into either category.227  
 
disproportionate impact is irrelevant in cases involving 
Constitution-based claims of racial discrimination. A statute, 
otherwise neutral on its face, must not be applied so as invidiously 
to discriminate on the basis of race. 
 219. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
 220. Id. at 430–32.  
 221. Id. at 427–28. 
 222. See Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 546 (1999) (“A facially neutral 
law, on the other hand, warrants strict scrutiny only if it can be proved that 
the law was ‘motivated by racial purpose or object’ or if it is ‘unexplainable on 
grounds other than race.’” (citations omitted)).   
 223. See Davis, 426 U.S. at 239 (stating that disproportionate impact alone 
does not trigger strict scrutiny). However, if the claim was brought under Title 
VII rather than the Fourteenth Amendment, the claimant could prevail 
without showing discriminatory intent. See infra Part VI.B.2.   
 224. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 293 (1986). 
 225. Id.  
 226. Id. at 294. 
 227. Id. (citing Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 400–01 (1986)). 
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Accordingly, successful claimants will likely need to rely on 
legislative history to prove intentional discrimination. This is 
an extremely hard burden to meet,228 as it is unlikely that a 
claimant will be able to find legislative history explicitly stating 
that a statute is intended to impact a racial group.229 Further, 
even if a claimant could prove that a legislator had a 
discriminatory purpose in enacting the legislation, the Court 
would still be hesitant to find a discriminatory purpose because 
“[w]hat motivates one legislator to make a speech about a 
statute is not necessarily what motivates scores of others to 
enact it . . . .”230 Thus, if a claimant cannot prove that the 
statute is part of a “movement”231 to discriminate on the basis 
of race, there is no remedy, no matter how egregious the 
impact.232   
Unfortunately, neither facially discriminatory challenges 
nor facially neutral challenges will afford relief to the victims 
 
 228. See Pers. Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (“‘Discriminatory 
purpose,’ however, implies more than the intent as volition or intent as 
awareness of consequences. It implies that the decisionmaker . . . selected or 
affirmed a particular course of action at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely 
‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.” (citations omitted)); 
Kemp, 481 U.S. at 298 (concluding that in order to succeed on a facially neutral 
challenge, the defendant must prove that the state legislature enacted or 
maintained the discriminatory statute “because of an anticipated racially 
discriminatory effect.” (emphasis in original)).  
 229. See David S. Law & David Zaring, Law Versus Ideology: The Supreme 
Court and the Use of Legislative History, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1653, 1661 
(2010)  
Judge Easterbrook, for one, has insisted that no such “intent” can 
be divined: “The meaning of statutes is to be found not in the 
subjective, multiple mind of Congress,” he has argued, for the 
simple reason that a multimember body such as Congress cannot 
formulate or act upon a single intent as if it were a unitary entity. 
 230. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 384 (1968).   
 231. See Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 229 (1985) (concluding there 
was discriminatory purpose where evidence showed the Alabama 
Constitutional Convention was “part of a movement . . . to disenfranchise 
Blacks”).  
 232. See Kemp, 481 U.S. at 289–99 (refusing to apply strict scrutiny 
despite statistics indicating that the death penalty was used in 22 percent of 
cases involving Black defendants and White victims, but only three percent of 
cases involving White defendants and Black victims because McCleskey did 
not prove that the legislators acted with “discriminatory purpose”). 
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who are denied compensation because of their criminal history. 
Despite evidence that a Black person is more likely to have a 
criminal conviction than a White person,233 individuals with a 
criminal history are not considered a suspect class.234 
Additionally, although there is statistical evidence that the 
criminal history ban has disproportionately affected Black 
victims, there is no evidence that these provisions were enacted 
because of their adverse effects on Black victims.235 
Consequently, the challengers would not be able to prove a 
discriminatory intent and the victim compensation statutes 
would not be reviewed under strict scrutiny. Any equal 
protection challenge to the bans, therefore, would result in the 
court applying a rational basis review.236 Under this review, the 
states could simply state that the criminal history ban is 
necessary to preserve funding for the “most worthy” victims and 
the Court would approve it.237 Or, the states could say nothing 
and the Court would uphold it if it could think of a justification 
for the statute that is rationally related to a legitimate end.238 
Thus, unless the Supreme Court reverses precedent and applies 
strict scrutiny to facially neutral statutes without requiring 
discriminatory intent, claimants must look to the legislature for 
relief.  
 
 233. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.  
 234. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.  
 235. See Santo III, supra note 100 (stating that Louisiana denied victims 
based on criminal history so that “true innocent victims of crimes” received 
the limited funding); Santo I, supra note 1 (noting that the ban on payouts to 
victims with a criminal history were “fueled by outrage” after a reputed 
mobster was killed and his widow collected compensation). 
 236. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996) (highlighting that a law 
that “neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class,” is 
subject to a rational basis review). 
 237. See supra notes 153–159 and accompanying text. 
 238. See supra notes 153–159 and accompanying text. 
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B.  Disparate Impact and the Civil Rights Act 
Fortunately, the Constitution provides the floor for basic 
rights, not the ceiling.239 While federal and state legislatures 
cannot take away the rights the Constitution secures for  the 
citizens of the United States, they can certainly give them 
more.240 Recognizing the shortcomings of equal protection 
jurisprudence, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
(“Civil Rights Act”)241 to do exactly that.242 The Civil Rights Act 
was designed to put an end to racial discrimination.243 Within 
multiple titles, Congress authorized plaintiffs to challenge 
facially neutral actions that have a discriminatory impact 
without having to prove a discriminatory purpose.244 Instead, 
Congress provided a burden-shifting framework, making it 
easier for plaintiffs claiming discrimination to prevail.   
This is one of the many reasons the Civil Rights Act is 
regarded as “the greatest legislative achievement of the civil 
rights movement.”245 Scholars have even argued that it is “the 
most important domestic legislation of the postwar era.”246 
However, even this extraordinary piece of legislation does not 
prevent the racial discrimination that stems from considering 
 
 239. See Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904 (1997) (distinguishing the 
“constitutional floor” from the ceiling set by “common law, statute, or the 
professional standards of the bench and bar”).   
 240. See id. (emphasizing that legislatures can only add on to existing 
constitutional rights). 
 241. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 87-195, 78 Stat. 241 (codified at 
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2018)). 
 242. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 
245– 46 (1964) (discussing the history of the Civil Rights Act).   
 243. See id. at 246 (“The Act as finally adopted was most comprehensive, 
undertaking to prevent . . . discrimination in voting, as well as places of 
accommodation and public facilities, federally secured programs and in 
employment.”).   
 244. See infra Part VI.B.2–3. 
 245. David B. Filvaroff & Raymond E. Wolfinger, The Origin and 
Enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, in LEGACIES OF THE 1964 CIVIL 
RIGHTS ACT 9, 9 (Bernard Grofman ed., 2000). 
 246. Id. See Sarah Hinger, Why Trump’s Effort to Eliminate Disparate 
Impact Rules Is a Terrible Idea, ACLU (Jan. 9, 2019, 5:15 PM), 
https://perma.cc/W49H-6SRJ (explaining how important the disparate impact 
claims have been to civil rights law).  
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criminal history.247 In fact, in the context of federally funded 
programs, Congress allows for legislation that prohibits felons 
from obtaining certain benefits, despite the disparate impact on 
minorities.248  
1.  Disparate Impact in the Context of Federally Funded 
Programs 
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act provides “[n]o person in the 
United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national 
origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied benefits of, 
or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity 
receiving federal financial assistance.”249 Federally funded 
programs include welfare programs designed to assist those in 
need by providing various forms of financial assistance, 
including food stamps, college grants, and Medicaid.250 
Ensuring that states cannot discriminate when allocating funds 
to welfare recipients is of the utmost importance as statistics 
demonstrate that minorities are the class most likely to be 
impoverished.251 Unfortunately, Congress did not codify 
disparate impact in Title VI as it did in other portions of the 
1964 Act252 and the Supreme Court has not extended Title VI to 
provide relief for facially neutral challenges.253 
Consequently, when administering programs that receive 
federal funding, states are not prohibited from employing 
 
 247. See infra Part VI.B.1–3. 
 248. See supra Part IV.B. 
 249. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d.  
 250. See Government Benefits, USA.GOV, https://perma.cc/FPZ9-48EK 
(“Federal government benefit programs can help people with a low income 
cover basic expenses like food, housing, and healthcare.”).  
 251. See People in Poverty by Selected Characteristics: 2017 and 2018, U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU (Sept. 10, 2019), https://perma.cc/CBX3-ZFS5 (reporting that 
the poverty rate for White people is ten percent, for Hispanics is 17.6 percent, 
and for Black people is 20.8 percent).  
 252. See infra Part VI.B.2–3. 
 253. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001) (concluding that 
Title VI does not included a private right of action to enforce disparate-impact 
regulations).  
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practices that disparately impact racial minorities.254 As long as 
states do not make explicit distinctions based on race, they can 
incorporate policies that have a discriminatory effect on 
minorities.255 Accordingly, the disproportionate number of 
Black victims and their loved ones denied victim compensation 
funds in Arkansas, Florida, Mississippi, North Carolina, Ohio, 
and Rhode Island have no way to challenge the criminal history 
ban.256 One solution would be for Congress to specifically allow 
for disparate impact challenges under Title VI and eliminate the 
discriminatory purpose requirement as it has in other titles of 
the Civil Rights Act.257 However, as discussed below, even where 
Congress has codified disparate impact, challenges of criminal 
history based discrimination still fail.258 
2.  Disparate Impact in the Context of Employment 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act prohibits racial 
discrimination in employment.259 Like challenges under the 
Equal Protection Clause, claimants can challenge an 
employment practice if it is facially discriminatory or facially 
neutral.260 The difference, however, is that when a claimant 
 
 254. See Dan McCaughey, The Death of Disparate Impact Under Title VI: 
Alexander v. Sandoval and Its Effects on Private Challenges to High-Stakes 
Testing Programs, 84 B.U. L. REV. 247, 266 (2004) (“After Sandoval, an 
individual plaintiff can only challenge a policy of a federally funded program 
if she can show intent to discriminate—a rare showing in the post-civil rights 
era.”). 
 255. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2018) (prohibiting only explicit 
discrimination). 
 256. See Archer & Williams, supra note 138, at 538 (“Congress has 
effectively dismantled the social safety net for ex-offenders and their 
families.”).  
 257. See infra Part VI.B.2–3. 
 258. See infra Part VI.B.2–3.  
 259. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice 
for an employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or 
otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such 
individual’s race . . . .”).   
 260. See id. (explaining the burden of proof for both facial and disparate 
impact challenges); Am. Nurses Ass’n v. Illinois, 783 F.2d 716, 722 (7th Cir. 
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challenges a facially neutral policy under Title VII, she does not 
have to prove there was a discriminatory purpose.261 Instead, 
the claimant can prove an employment practice has a disparate 
impact through a burden-shifting framework.262 
 Under this framework, the claimant must first prove the 
employment policy or practice “causes a disparate impact on the 
basis of race.”263 Once the plaintiff proves her prima facie 
case— often by providing statistics of racial 
discrimination264— the burden shifts to the employer to prove 
the practice is “job related for the position in question and 
consistent with business necessity.”265 If the employer meets her 
 
1986) (“[W]hen intentional discrimination is charged under Title VII the 
inquiry is the same as in an equal protection case. The difference between the 
statutory and constitutional prohibitions becomes important only 
when . . . the challenge is based on a theory of ‘disparate impact,’ as distinct 
from ‘disparate treatment.’”).  
 261. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (stating the burden of proof in disparate 
impact cases and not including purpose or intent); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 
401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (“[G]ood intent or absence of discriminatory intent 
does not redeem employment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate 
as ‘built-in headwinds’ for minority groups and are unrelated to measuring job 
capability.”); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 246–47 (1976) (“Under Title 
VII, Congress provided that when hiring and promotion practices 
disqualifying substantially disproportionate numbers of Blacks are 
challenged, discriminatory purpose need not be proved . . . .”). 
 262. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (denoting the framework for disparate 
impact cases); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) 
(explaining that the complainant carries the initial burden of showing a prima 
facie case of disparate impact and that once the showing is made, the burden 
shifts to the employer to articulate a nondiscriminatory purpose).  
 263. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k); see Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430–31 (discussing the 
discriminatory employment practice first, then moving to the employer’s claim 
of business necessity); Robinson v. Union Carbide Corp., 538 F.2d 652, 661 
(5th Cir. 1976) (“After the prima facie case [of discrimination] is established, 
the burden of persuasion shifts to the corporation . . . .”).   
 264. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430 (accepting statistics showing White people 
graduated high school more often than Black people and that White people did 
better on the company’s required tests than Black people as evidence of racial 
discrimination); Robinson, 538 F.2d at 660–61 (finding statistics of Black 
workers in menial job positions and White workers in high-ranking positions 
as “sufficient” to establish  prima facie case of employment discrimination). 
 265. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2018); see Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431 (“Congress has 
placed on the employer the burden of showing that any given requirement 
must have a manifest relationship to the employment in question.”); 
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burden, the claimant can still prevail if she demonstrates that 
the employer refused to adopt an “alternative employment 
practice” that is effective and has a less discriminatory effect.266 
Thus, by not requiring proof of a discriminatory purpose, 
Congress made it easier to protect employees from racial 
discrimination.267 Even under this framework, however, those 
impacted by discriminatory employment practices resulting 
from criminal history are left without any redress.268  
Despite wanting to remove “artificial, arbitrary, and 
unnecessary barriers to employment,”269 Congress has not 
utilized Title VII to address the racial discrimination resulting 
from having a criminal history.270 Today, nearly all employers 
conduct background checks before hiring an individual271 and 
many have “adopted broad hiring prohibitions” on individuals 
 
Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 446 (1982) (“If an employment practice 
which operates to exclude [Black people] cannot be shown to be related to job 
performance, the practice is prohibited.” (citation omitted)); Albemarle Paper 
Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431 (1975) (concluding that the discriminatory 
tests would be impermissible unless they were “predictive of or significantly 
correlated with important elements of work behavior . . . which are relevant 
to the job”). 
 266. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. See Albemarle Paper Co., 422 U.S. at 425 (“If an 
employer does then meet the burden of proving that its tests are ‘job related,’ 
it remains open to the complaining party to show that other tests or selection 
devices, without a similarly undesirable racial effect, would also serve the 
employer’s legitimate interest in ‘efficient and trustworthy workmanship.’”); 
Teal, 457 U.S. at 446 (stating that even if the employer were to prove that 
their discriminatory purpose was a business necessity, the plaintiff could 
“prevail” if he or she shows the employer was using the practice as mere 
pretext). 
 267. See Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination: The Reality 
of Supreme Court Rhetoric, 86 GEO. L.J. 279, 290–91 (1997) (describing the 
difficulties of proving a discriminatory intent).  
 268. See infra notes 269–291 and accompanying text. 
 269. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).  
 270. See Kimani Paul-Emile, Beyond Title VII: Rethinking Race, 
Ex-Offender Status, and Employment Discrimination in the Information Age, 
100 VA. L. REV. 893, 927 (2014) (discussing the limitations that “severely 
constrain” Title VII’s ability to prevent and redress racial discrimination and 
ensure equal opportunity). 
 271. See National Survey: Employers Universally Using Background 
Checks to Protect Employees, Customers, and the Public, 
https://perma.cc/X9GD-Q3X (explaining that the study “demonstrated that 
nearly all human resources professionals” utilize background screening).  
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with a criminal record.272 Recognizing that blanket exclusions 
can have a disparate impact on minorities due to higher arrest 
and conviction rates,273 in 2012 the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission issued enforcement guidance 
prohibiting employers from automatically barring employment 
from those with a criminal record.274 Instead, the guidance 
allows employers to simply consider criminal history when 
making employment decisions and prohibits using criminal 
history differently for different applicants based on their race or 
national origin.275 While these guidelines clarified the standards 
employers must follow to comply with Title VII, Title VII has 
still been “an insufficient means of addressing the race 
discrimination that stems from the use of criminal history 
reports in employment.”276  
Although racial disparate impact challenges based on an 
employer’s consideration of criminal history were met with some 
success in the 1970s and 1980s,277 since then plaintiffs have 
been largely unsuccessful.278 This failure can be attributed to an 
intense scrutiny of the evidence of disparate impact and strong 
 
 272. Paul-Emile, supra note 270, at 895–97. 
 273. See EEOC Enforcement Guidance: Consideration of Arrest and 
Conviction Records in Employment Decisions Under Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N (Apr. 25, 2012), 
https://perma.cc/LZ5J-SUGP (“National data supports a finding that criminal 
record exclusions have a disparate impact based on race and national origin. 
The national data provides a basis for the Commission to investigate Title VII 
disparate impact charges challenging criminal record exclusions.”). 
 274. Id.   
 275. Id.  
 276. Paule-Emile, supra note 270, at 924. 
 277. See Green v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 523 F.2d 1290, 1298 (8th Cir. 1975) 
(“We cannot conceive of any business necessity that would automatically place 
every individual convicted of any offense . . . in the permanent ranks of the 
unemployed.”); see also Reynolds v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 102, 498 F. 
Supp. 952, 973–75 (D.D.C. 1980) (invalidating the use of arrest records as 
“knock-out” criteria).  
 278. See Alexandra Harwin, Title VII Challenges to Employment 
Discrimination Against Minority Men with Criminal Records, 14 BERKELEY J. 
AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 4, 12 (2012) (“Since the late 1980s judgments have been 
almost uniformly grim for plaintiffs alleging that the consideration of criminal 
records disparately impacts Black or Hispanic job applicants.”).  
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deference to employers.279 In the past, courts accepted general 
population statistics on arrests and convictions as evidence of 
disparate impact.280 Today, the general consensus seems to be 
“that the role discrimination plays in contemporary America has 
been sharply diminished, and those who take this view are 
reluctant to find discrimination absent compelling evidence.”281 
As a result, courts now expect plaintiffs to produce data that is 
both “specific and comprehensive.”282 Courts want “more refined 
statistics on the population qualified to perform and actually 
seeking the job at issue.”283 This can be extremely difficult. Not 
only is the standard now more onerous, but because criminal 
record discrimination occurs almost exclusively during the 
hiring stage, it is extremely difficult for applicants to “acquire 
the empirical data necessary to show how the employer has 
treated similarly situated applicants.”284  
Additionally, while raising the bar for plaintiffs, courts also 
lowered the bar for the employers by holding them to “radically 
relaxed standards for business necessity and job relatedness.”285 
While it is true that a criminal record is “arguably relevant to 
employment,” employers are not required to give legitimate 
reasons for refusing to hire applicants with criminal records.286 
For example, one employer’s interest in “minimizing the 
 
 279. See id. at 12–13 (discussing the low rate of applicants’ success in 
recent years). 
 280. See Gregory v. Litton Sys., Inc., 316 F. Supp. 401, 403 (C.D. Cal. 1970) 
(concluding that statistics showing Black people were arrested “substantially 
more frequently than Whites in proportion to their numbers” was 
“overwhelmingly and utterly convincing” proof of disparate impact); Green, 
523 F.2d at 1294–95 (accepting statistics showing that Black people were 
convicted of crimes at higher rates than White people in the area and records 
of the number of Black people rejected because of their conviction record as a 
prima facie case of discrimination).   
 281. Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard 
to Win?, 61 LA. L. REV. 555, 563 (2001) [hereinafter Selmi II]. 
 282. Harwin, supra note 278, at 16. See Fletcher v. Berkowitz Oliver 
Williams Shaw & Eisenbrandt, LLP, 537 F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1030 (W.D. Mo. 
2008) (denying the claimants challenge because he gave statistics of general 
felony rates and not his specific felony).  
 283. Harwin, supra note 278, at 16. 
 284. Paule-Emile, supra note 270, at 926. 
 285. Harwin, supra note 278, at 14.  
 286. Paule-Emile, supra note 270, at 925. 
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perceived risk of employee dishonesty” justified his policy of 
disqualifying all job applicants with a felony record.287  
However, heightened scrutiny of the claimant’s evidence 
and employer deference are not solely to blame. An apparent 
“distaste for plaintiffs with criminal records” has seemingly 
played a role in plaintiffs’ decreased success.288 For example, 
when a Florida district court considered the disparate impact 
resulting from a felony bar to employment,289 the judge 
“captured the zeitgeist”290 of courts today when he wrote:  
Obviously a rule refusing honest employment to convicted 
applicants is going to have a disparate impact upon thieves. 
That some of these thieves are going to be Hispanic is 
immaterial. That apparently a higher percentage of 
Hispanics are convicted of crimes than that of the “White” 
population may prove a number of things such as: (1) 
Hispanics are not very good at stealing, (2) Whites are better 
thieves than Hispanics, (3) none of the above, (4) all of the 
above. Regardless, the honesty of a prospective employee is 
certainly a vital consideration in the hiring decision. If 
Hispanics do not wish to be discriminated against because 
they have been convicted of theft then, they should stop 
stealing. . . . Can an employer refuse to hire persons 
convicted of a felony even though it has a disparate impact 
on minority members? This court’s answer is a firm “Yes.”291  
As evidenced by the Florida district court, it seems courts are 
less than willing to strike down discrimination based on 
criminal history. Accordingly, the racial discrimination 
resulting from an applicant’s criminal history continues to 
remain prevalent today.292  
 
 287. Williams v. Scott, No. 92 C 747, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13643, at *7 
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 3, 1992) (emphasis added). 
 288. Harwin, supra note 278, at 13. 
 289. EEOC v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp., 723 F. Supp. 734 (S.D. Fla. 
1989). 
 290. Harwin, supra note 278, at 13. 
 291. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp., 723 F. Supp. at 753.  
 292. See Why Do We Need E-Race?, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY 
COMM’N, E-RACE INITIATIVE, https://perma.cc/9S8X-N5E2 (discussing the 
“facially neutral employment criteria” that “significantly” disadvantage 
applicants and employees on the basis of race).   
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3.  Disparate Impact in the Context of Housing 
In 1968, President Lyndon B. Johnson signed the Civil 
Rights Act of 1968, which expanded Civil Rights Act of 1964.293 
Title VIII of the 1968 Act, also known as the Fair Housing Act,294 
prohibits racial discrimination in the sale, rental, and financing 
of housing.295 Like Title VII, the Fair Housing Act prohibits both 
facially discriminatory practices and facially neutral practices 
that have a disparate impact.296 Claimants who bring disparate 
impact challenges under the Fair Housing Act do not have to 
prove a discriminatory purpose, again making proving 
discrimination easier than doing so under the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. 297 However, these 
additional safeguards do not protect those with a criminal 
history from housing discrimination.298 In fact, when the 
Supreme Court recognized disparate impact as a cognizable 
claim under the Fair Housing Act, the Court simultaneously 
concluded that exclusionary practices aimed at individuals with 
criminal convictions were completely lawful.299  
Further, like in the federal funding context, Congress 
makes housing unavailable to certain individuals with criminal 
 
 293. Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 284, 82 Stat. 73. See History of 
Fair Housing, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING & URBAN DEV., https://perma.cc/3QZ5-
FG3V (providing a history of the Fair Housing Act). 
 294. 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2018).   
 295. Id.  
 296. See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 
Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2518–21 (2015) (explaining why the Fair Housing Act 
must be construed to encompass claims of disparate impact).  
 297. See id. at 2513. (distinguishing disparate impact claims as those that 
have a “disproportionately adverse effect on minorities and are otherwise 
unjustified by a legitimate rationale” (citations omitted)).   
 298. See Archer & Williams, supra note 138, at 541 (“[F]ederal law grants 
public housing agencies broad discretion to deny housing to virtually anyone 
with a criminal record.”).  
 299. See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 135 S. Ct. at 2521  
But the amendments do constrain disparate-impact liability. For 
instance, certain criminal convictions are correlated with sex and 
race. . . . By adding an exemption from liability for exclusionary 
practices aimed at individuals with drug convictions, Congress 
ensured disparate-impact liability would not lie if a landlord 
excluded tenants with such convictions. 
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convictions.300 For example, all federally assisted housing 
agencies or owners can deny admission to housing if they 
determine 
that an applicant or any member of an applicant’s household 
is or was, during a reasonable time preceding the date when 
the applicant household would otherwise be selected for 
admission, engaged in any drug-related or violent criminal 
activity or other criminal activity which would adversely 
affect the health, safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment of the 
premises by other residents, the owner, or the public housing 
agency employees . . . .301 
Congress and the courts defend these discriminatory 
practices by stating that “criminal activity threatens the health, 
safety, [and] right to peaceful enjoyment of the premises” that 
other tenants of the housing deserve.302 In reality, these policies 
tend to “punish, even fracture entire families for the past 
behavior of one member of the household,” while failing to 
significantly advance the policy’s goals.303 Regardless, Congress 
has spoken: individuals with a criminal history do not receive 
protection, despite the negative impact this has on Black 
individuals.304 Consequently, even when Congress enacts 
legislation to allow claims of disparate impact, individuals with 
a criminal history are left unprotected.  
 
 300. See Archer & Williams, supra note 138, at 540–43 (discussing 
legislation that prevents individuals with a criminal conviction from obtaining 
housing).  
 301. 42 U.S.C. § 13661.  
 302. Id.  § 1437d; see Archer & Williams, supra note 138, at 542 (“Although 
purportedly designed to provide for a safer environment for public housing 
residents, these laws, decisions, and policies do not significantly advance this 
goal. Instead, they just exacerbate the challenges of reentry.”). 
 303. Archer & Williams, supra note 138, at 543. 
 304. See Sharifa Rahmany, The Dark Cloud of Collateral Consequences: 
Ex-Offenders Serving Civilly Imposed Sentences Post-Incarceration, 48 CRIM. 
L. BULL. 1139, 1146 (2012) (“Federal law allows housing agencies to deny 
housing based on a person having a criminal record.”). 
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VII.     A Proposed Solution: Protecting All Victims 
A.  Why We Need a Solution 
Victim compensation programs were created to assist 
victims and “promote justice and healing for all victims of 
crime.”305 Our criminal justice system emphasizes reparation to 
victims as one of its central purposes.306 Yet, the programs in 
Arkansas, Florida, Mississippi, North Carolina, Ohio, and 
Rhode Island deny compensation to victims previously convicted 
of certain felonies, affecting a disproportionate number of Black 
victims.307 A solution to this injustice is necessary for a number 
of reasons: (1) to stop punishing individuals who have already 
served their sentences; (2) to ensure that people who are 
convicted of a crime are given a chance of success at reentry into 
society; and (3) perhaps most importantly, to stop racial 
disparity from permeating another aspect of our criminal justice 
system.  
The criminal history ban is another punishment that the 
state tacks on to previously incarcerated individuals once they 
are released.308 The individual has already served her sentence, 
yet she is forced to continue to pay for her crime.309 Or, in the 
case of Ohio, the state can sentence an individual and make her 
pay for a crime that she was not even convicted of.310 Despite 
being an additional sentence, the ban does not serve any 
 
 305. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 185, at 1 (emphasis added);  see 
Goldscheid, supra note 34, at 186 (“[T]he [victim’s assistance] legislation was 
premised on the theory that the programs would assist the operation of the 
criminal justice system and reflected a general social welfare notion of 
responsibility for the crime victim.”). 
 306. See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, SENTENCING § 18-2.1 (3d 
ed. 1994) (suggesting that legislatures consider reparation to victims of crimes 
as one of the five societal purposes for sentencing systems).   
 307. See supra Parts III, V.  
 308. See Demleitner, supra note 137, at 154 (stating that for some 
offenders, collateral consequences are “the most persistent punishments” 
inflicted for their crime).  
 309. See Archer & Williams, supra note 138, at 583 (“[Collateral 
consequences] are often viewed by those who enact them as punitive means to 
hold ex-offenders further accountable for their actions.”). 
 310. See supra Part III.B. 
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legitimate sentencing purpose.311 The ban “merely add[s] to the 
overall severity of the sentence without being grounded in 
theories of retribution, prevention, deterrence, or 
rehabilitation.”312 The ban is not retributive because it is not 
disclosed to her at her sentence, is not specific to her case, and 
does not affect the majority of individuals convicted of crime.313 
Banning compensation does not prevent or deter individuals 
from committing crimes.314 Most offenders are unaware of the 
criminal history bans and, if they are aware, do not intend to 
become a victim of a crime.315 The ban, therefore, cannot deter 
them from committing crime.316  
Additionally, the ban does not promote rehabilitation, but 
“actively thwart[s] attempts at rehabilitation by preventing the 
ex-offender’s integration into society.”317 By banning previously 
incarcerated individuals from compensation, the six states are 
making successful reentry into society nearly impossible.318 
Because individuals with felony convictions can be prohibited 
from obtaining certain employment, housing, and federal 
welfare benefits,319 they are likely to already be in financially 
 
 311. See Demleitner, supra note 137, at 154 (“The impact of collateral 
consequences is especially disturbing since such consequences frequently lack 
penological justification.”). 
 312. Id. 
 313. See id. at 160 (explaining that to be retributive, the punishment needs 
to be clearly designated as part of the sentence). 
 314. See id. at 161 (discussing the ineffectiveness of collateral 
consequences as deterrents).  
 315. See id. (“[Collateral consequences as] deterrents often are ineffective, 
since potential offenders do no usually weigh the costs and benefits of their 
actions. In addition, the relatively low visibility of collateral consequences 
makes them unlikely deterrents to crime.”). 
 316. See Carla Cesaroni & Nicholas Bala, Deterrence as a Principle of 
Youth Sentencing: No Effect on Youth, but a Significant Effect on Judges, 34 
QUEEN’S L.J. 447, 465 (2008) (explaining that for a sentence to be a deterrent 
it must prevent others from committing crime).  
 317. Demleitner, supra note 137, at 160.  
 318. See Archer & Williams, supra note 138, at 544–46 (analyzing the 
interplay of collateral consequences and the detrimental effect on previously 
convicted individuals).   
 319. See supra Part IV.B. 
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precarious situations.320 When tragedy strikes, the state’s 
victim compensation program may be the only place for the 
victim to turn.321 In fact, compensation will only be distributed 
if the victim can prove that she cannot receive funding from any 
other source.322 Without compensation, these victims are left 
with no way to pay for their medical bills, funeral expenses, or 
crime scene cleanup.323 This leaves the individual with few real 
options outside of crime.324 If our criminal justice system 
believes in rehabilitation at all, we must ensure compensation 
for these individuals.325 We must give these individuals a 
chance at success.326 
To make matters worse, this ban affects Black victims more 
often than it affects White victims.327 This is another way Black 
men and women are treated unfairly within the criminal justice 
system.328 Police have higher rates of contact with Black 
individuals.329 Black people are arrested more often that White 
people.330 They are convicted more frequently.331 They are 
sentenced more harshly.332 Now, as victims, they are also 
 
 320. See Rahmany, supra note 304, at 1145 (“Without employment, an 
ex-offender is neither able to meet his basic needs, nor financially support 
himself or his family. In addition, without access to affordable housing, food 
stamps, and rehabilitative programming, an ex-offender is unlikely to find 
stability and live a productive life.”).  
 321. See supra Part II.D. 
 322. See supra notes 96–99 and accompanying text.  
 323. See supra Part II.C.  
 324. See Archer & Williams, supra note 138, at 529 (“Saddled with 
collateral consequences, ex-offenders often return to the illegal practices that 
initially led to their convictions.”).  
 325. See Demleitner, supra note 137, at 160 (“If one subscribes to the 
notion that ex-offenders should be given a second chance to rehabilitate 
themselves and become useful and productive members of society, society 
must also provide the means for such reintegration . . . .”). 
 326. See Archer & Williams, supra note 138, at 582–83 (explaining the 
“devastating impact” of collateral consequences). 
 327. See supra Part IV.  
 328. See supra notes 195–207 and accompanying text.  
 329. See supra note 197 and accompanying text. 
 330. See supra note 197 and accompanying text. 
 331. See supra note 197 and accompanying text. 
 332. See supra note 197 and accompanying text. 
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disproportionately denied compensation.333 This is not to 
suggest that racial disparity and mass incarceration are the 
result of a conscious and deliberate effort of racial suppression 
because they are more likely a symptom of institutionalized 
racism.334 Nevertheless, regardless of the impetus, it is an 
injustice to allow the racial disparity of the criminal justice 
system to infiltrate victim compensation as well.335 States 
should not be permitted to continue to reject the victims who 
need compensation the most, especially when based upon 
unfounded stereotypes of an innocent victim.336  
Proponents of the criminal history ban defend it as a way to 
save funding for “the most worthy victims.”337 This argument 
fails for two reasons. First, victim compensation programs 
already exclude victims who are complicit in the act that injured 
them or who committed a crime at the time of the injury.338 
These requirements ensure that only victims that are innocent 
in bringing about their injury are compensated.339 States with a 
criminal history ban, however, define an innocent victim based 
on their past conduct.340 Essentially, the state legislators are 
telling victims that because they have a criminal history, they 
 
 333. See supra notes 189–196 and accompanying text.  
 334. See Hunt II, supra note 198, at 29 (“The problems of racialized mass 
incarceration: [D]o not stem from explicit and intentional race or class 
discrimination, but they are problems of inequality nonetheless.” (alteration 
in original) (citation omitted)).  
 335. See supra Part V.  
 336. See Goldscheid, supra note 34, at 191–92 (“Although [criminal history 
bans] undoubtedly originated in an attempt to ensure that only ‘law abiding’ 
individuals receive compensation, it can produce a harsh result.”).   
 337. See Santo II, supra note 63 (“Some compensation funds struggle to 
cover costs, bolstering one argument in favor of limits: Money should be save 
for the most worthy victims.”).  
 338. See supra notes 93–95 and accompanying text.   
 339. See Goldscheid, supra note 34, at 189 (listing common eligibility 
requirements, such as prompt reporting to the police, as a way to ensure only 
“innocent” victims are compensated). 
 340. See id. (“[M]any programs’ interpretation of “innocent” victims 
precludes individuals with any criminal record from recovery, rather than 
limiting the exclusion to those who committed the crime giving rise to the 
compensation claim.”).   
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are less of a victim.341 The legislators are telling the victims that 
they are not deserving of help in their time of need.342 “Victim” 
should not be defined by an individual’s past, but solely by the 
fact that they have fallen victim to a crime. 
Second, the argument that funding is limited is unfounded. 
Funding is certainly not an issue in Ohio, Florida, or Rhode 
Island.343 Rhode Island’s outstanding balance consisted of 
almost two million dollars in 2013.344 In 2017, Florida ended the 
year with a balance of $12 million dollars and Ohio with $15 
million.345 Further, even if states do have issues with scarce 
funding, there are other ways to limit the amount of money 
spent each year or increase funds without denying 
compensation to those who need it the most. For example, states 
can find creative ways to increase their revenue, like the states 
that draw a portion of inmate wages to supplement their 
fund.346 Or, states can set lower caps and ensure that more 
people get at least some money in their time of need.347 Denying 
certain victims from access to compensation is not the way to 
conserve funding.  
When President Ronald Reagan signed the Executive Order 
establishing the President’s Task Force on Victims of Crime, he 
stated: 
Our concern for crime victims rests on far more than simple 
recognition that it could happen to any of us. It’s also rooted 
in the realization that regardless of who is victimized or the 
extent to which any one of us may personally be threatened, 
all of us have an interest in seeing that justice is done not 
 
 341. See Santo I, supra note 1 (describing those denied as a result of the 
criminal history ban as “the victims who don’t count”).  
 342. See id. (“Victims and their families said the rigid policies make it 
seem like states are separating crime victims into two kinds of people: those 
who matter, and those who do not.”).  
 343. See supra notes 66–70 and accompanying text. 
 344. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.  
 345. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.  
 346. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.  
 347. See supra notes 71–74 and accompanying text. 
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only to the criminal but also for those who suffer the 
consequences of his crime.348 
Banning an individual because of a past crime flies in the face 
of former President Reagan’s declaration.349 A solution to the 
criminal history ban is necessary to ensure justice for all 
victims, including those with a criminal record.  
B.  Why Victim Compensation is Different Than Other Welfare 
Benefits 
Congress has actively prohibited individuals with a 
criminal history from receiving certain welfare benefits.350 
Nonetheless, victim compensation should be treated differently 
for two reasons: (1) the arguments that apply to other welfare 
programs do not apply to victim compensation; and (2) 
considering the government failed to protect the victim from 
crime, the government has a duty to make the victim whole 
again. Prohibiting previously incarcerated individuals from 
welfare benefits is defended as way to deter crime and prevent 
welfare fraud,351 but the ban does not deter individuals from 
committing crime.352 Individuals are likely unaware of the 
criminal history ban and, even if they do know about it, they 
probably do not believe they will fall victim to crime.353 A person 
cannot be deterred if they do not believe the consequence will 
ever apply to them.354  
Additionally, welfare fraud is not an issue with victim 
compensation. Congress’s reasoning for denying previous drug 
offenders food stamps is that the recipients will exchange food 
 
 348. 2017 OVC Report to the Nation: Introduction: Implementing Our 
Vision, OFF. FOR VICTIMS CRIME, https://perma.cc/YZT4-RNF8 (emphasis 
added).  
 349. See Santo III, supra note 100 (discussing Louisiana’s decision to 
redefine victim). 
 350. See supra Part IV.B. 
 351. See supra Part IV.B.2. 
 352. See supra notes 314–316 and accompanying text.  
 353. See supra notes 314–316 and accompanying text. 
 354. See Five Things About Deterrence, NAT’L INSTITUTION JUST. (June 5, 
2016), https://perma.cc/5B3A-2X9E (explaining that increasing the severity of 
punishment is ineffective as a deterrent because “criminals know little about 
the sanctions for specific crimes”).  
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stamps for drugs or money.355 Victims who receive 
compensation, however, are compensated only for already 
incurred expenses that they can prove and have not received 
any other funding for.356 Therefore, it is extremely unlikely that 
the victim could spend the money on anything other than her 
resulting bills.357 Similarly, unlike in the housing and 
employment context, there is no “business necessity” or need to 
protect others when compensating victims.358 Distributing 
compensation to the victim cannot harm others.359 
Compensation is allocated to victims and their families to cover 
already incurred expenses, and that allocation does not affect 
the general public.360  
Moreover, compensating all victims comports with the 
underlying theory of victim compensation.361 State-sponsored 
victim compensation began because of the belief that when 
someone is victimized, the government is at fault for failing to 
protect her and now must make her whole again.362 Victim 
compensation in America was founded on the belief that the 
government should provide security and protection for society’s 
most vulnerable. Victims with a criminal history in need of 
compensation are society’s most vulnerable and they are in need 
of assistance.363  
 
 355. See supra notes 181–182 and accompanying text. See Archer & 
Williams, supra note 138, at 567–69, for a discussion of why denying food 
stamps to individuals previously convicted of drug crimes does not work as a 
deterrent. 
 356. See supra Part II.C–D.  
 357. See Santo I, supra note 1 (describing victims who took out loans and 
maxed credit cards to pay for medical bills before applying to the state’s 
compensation program). 
 358. See supra Part VI.B.1–2. 
 359. C.f. Archer & Williams, supra note 138, at 541 (explaining that the 
denial of housing to individuals wither certain convictions records stems from 
the desire to protect other residents). 
 360. See supra Part II.C–D. 
 361. See supra Part II.B.  
 362. See supra notes 37–45 and accompanying text. 
 363. See supra notes 37–45 and accompanying text. 
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C.  A Reform Movement 
State legislatures throughout the nation have taken a stand 
against collateral consequences.364 “In 2019, 43 states, the 
District of Columbia, and the federal government enacted an 
extraordinary 152 laws aimed at reducing barriers faced by 
people with criminal records in the workplace, at the ballot box, 
and in many other areas of daily life.”365 This “prolific legislative 
track record . . . reflects a lively national conversation about 
how best to limit unwarranted record-based discrimination and 
to promote reintegration.”366 One important example of this 
reform legislation is Congress’s recent passage of the Fair 
Chance Act.367 The Act, signed into law on December 20, 2019, 
prevents federal employers from requesting criminal history 
information from applicants before the conditional offer 
stage.368 This means that employers cannot throw out an 
application because of an individual’s criminal record before 
they consider the individuals qualifications.369 This gives 
previously incarcerated applicants a fair chance at employment 
opportunities within the federal government.370 The Fair 
Chance Act evidences Congress’s changing attitude on collateral 
consequences.371 
 
 364. See PATHWAYS TO REINTEGRATION: CRIMINAL RECORD REFORMS IN 2019 
1 (Collateral Consequences Resource Center 2020), https://perma.cc/N6SE-
QCXV (PDF) (explaining the record number of states to reduce reentry 
barriers in 2019). 
 365. Id.  
 366. Id.  
 367. 5 U.S.C. § 9202 (2018).  
 368. Id.  
 369. See FAQ: Fair Chance to Compete for Jobs Act of 2019, NAT’L EMP. L. 
PROJECT (Dec. 17, 2019), https://perma.cc/BE78-HVLG (explaining the effect 
of the Fair Chance Act). 
 370. See id. (“[T]he FCA . . . will both remove barriers to employment for 
people with records and promote the public safety in the communities hardest 
hit by unemployment.”). 
 371. See PATHWAYS TO INTEGRATION: CRIMINAL RECORD REFORMS IN 2019, 
supra note 364, at 1 (noting that in the last seven years the federal government 
has taken steps to chip away at collateral consequences). 
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Another important and very relevant legislative change 
occurred in Louisiana in 2019.372 When the Marshall Project 
released the results of their study showing the disparate impact 
of the criminal history ban, Louisiana was one of seven states 
that barred victims from receiving compensation if they had a 
criminal record.373 Louisiana enacted its ban because its 
compensation program was designed “to assist true innocent 
victims of crime . . . . Innocent meaning not just at that very 
moment, but what’s the history of the particular person.”374 
However, a review of ninety-one claims from 2015 through 2017 
revealed that about 80 percent of victims turned down solely 
because of a felony conviction in Louisiana were Black.375 The 
review further demonstrated that most of the victims had been 
murdered and their grieving family members were the ones 
actually denied compensation.376 These findings caused 
Louisiana district attorneys to question the logic behind the 
state’s definition of “innocent.”377 One district attorney 
advocating to repeal the ban stated, “[s]o a person who is a 
victim that has a criminal past can’t be an innocent victim? 
They’re not innocent? That’s discriminatory.”378 The legislature 
agreed.379 Despite the fact that Louisiana’s victim compensation 
fund is “chronically low,” the Louisiana legislature unanimously 
passed legislation that prohibits Louisiana’s Crime Victims 
Reparations Board from denying compensation because of a 
victim’s criminal history.380  
The Fair Chance Act, Louisiana’s new definition of victim, 
and the unprecedented number of new record reform laws 
enacted in 2019 exemplify a movement taking place in the 
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United States.381 The purpose of the movement “has been to 
advance a public policy of promoting reintegration for people 
with a criminal record.”382 However, not all states are following 
suit. Arkansas’s Crime Victim Reparations Board, for example, 
recently voted against asking legislators to lift the state’s 
lifetime ban on people with certain felony convictions.383 The 
Rhode Island legislature declined to take up a proposal that 
would allow compensation for any victim’s funeral, regardless of 
their criminal record.384 Florida rejected a measure in 2017 to 
remove low-level burglary convictions, the most common reason 
for rejection in Florida, from the list of disqualifying felonies.385 
It is time for these six states to join the movement.   
D.  Redefining “Victim” 
There is currently no legal remedy for the victims denied 
critical compensation because of their criminal record.386 I 
suggest that the legislatures in Arkansas, Florida, Ohio, 
Mississippi, North Carolina, and Rhode Island follow 
Louisiana’s lead and amend their victim compensation 
legislation.387 The amendments should expand the definition of 
a victim to include individuals with a criminal history.388 This 
change is consistent with the purpose of victim compensation 
programs and is necessary to end the current racial 
discrimination plaguing their compensation programs.389  
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Additionally, I propose that Congress amend its Crime 
Victim Compensation legislation and refuse federal funding to 
programs that deny compensation to victims based on their 
criminal history. Congress already requires the states to 
compensate certain victims in order to receive funding. 390 This 
would only be a modest addition and, considering the states 
receive a large part of their budget from the federal government, 
this change could have a real impact.391 States would have to 
choose to either continue to deny victims based on the criminal 
history and lose a significant amount of funding, or expand their 
definition of “victim” and continue to receive funding. Congress 
already chose to distinguish victim compensation from other 
welfare programs by not prohibiting individuals with certain 
felony convictions from receiving compensation.392 Congress 
should take this policy decision one step further and incentivize 
states to compensate all victims. This is more in line with the 
purpose of VOCA and fundamental justice.393  
VIII.      Conclusion 
When tragedy strikes and an individual falls victim to 
crime, the victim and her family may endure financial stress as 
devastating as her injuries.394 With the offender in jail and 
unable to pay restitution, the victim is forced to pay for medical 
bills, funeral and burial costs, and mental health counseling.395 
Unable to afford these expenses, the victim must rely on her 
state’s compensation program.396 Regrettably, victims in 
Arkansas, Florida, Ohio, Mississippi, North Carolina, and 
Rhode Island are denied compensation on account of their 
criminal history.397 The victim, at her most vulnerable time, is 
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left with nowhere to turn.398 To make matters worse, as a result 
of the racial disparity that flows through our criminal justice 
system, this ban disproportionately affects Black victims.399 
Consequently, Black victims and their families are left with no 
way to pay for the bills resulting from a crime they were 
innocent in.400 The United States Constitution and Congress 
have left these victims without a remedy.401  
A legislative solution is necessary to ensure that 
punishment for a criminal conviction ends with the completion 
of the individual’s sentence.402 The individual has already “paid” 
for her crime and must be allowed to move forward.403 
Additionally, a legislative solution is necessary to give 
previously incarcerated individuals a real chance of success at 
reentry into society.404 The goals of rehabilitation require that 
previously incarcerated individuals have a genuine opportunity 
to turn their lives around.405 Finally, and most importantly, a 
legislative solution is necessary to put an end to the race 
discrimination stemming from the victim compensation 
programs.406 Black victims are already more likely to be 
impoverished and to have experienced discrimination within 
the criminal justice system.407 The discrimination should not be 
permitted to seep into victim compensation programs as well.408 
Accordingly, I suggest a solution to this problem: the federal 
government, and legislatures in Arkansas, Florida, Ohio, 
Mississippi, North Carolina, and Rhode Island, should join the 
record reform movement taking place throughout the nation 
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and promote successful reintegration for those with a criminal 
record.409 These victims are depending on it.  
 
 
 409. See supra Part II.D. 
